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Abstract 
Jean C. O’Connor 
INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY PROTECTIONS: DO STATE LAWS OFFER PUBLIC 
HEALTH LEADERS THE FLEXIBILITY THEY NEED?  
 (Under the direction of Thomas C. Ricketts, III, Ph.D.) 
 
Some scholars have argued that there is a tension between privacy and the public’s health. 
This study explores that tension in a contemporary context by examining the current status of 
informational privacy laws and by inquiring whether current state statutes are adequate to 
protect the privacy of public health information during a time when terrorism and 
globalization appears to be forcing a choice between liberty and security. Two methods were 
used in this study: 1) a point-in-time policy analysis of state public health privacy laws using 
criteria previously established by a panel of public health privacy experts; and 2) key 
informant interviews with federal officials, national organizations, and state health officials 
and privacy officers. The findings suggested that despite much attention over the past decade, 
including the development of model state statutes, few states have laws that comprehensively 
address both public health privacy and disclosure. Both federal and state officials viewed 
privacy protections for health-related data as important and recognized the tension between 
privacy interests and the need to share information. Sociopolitical factors and interest groups 
have driven change in the laws of some states while other states have made few changes to 
their laws over the past decade. State officials suggested that state public health privacy 
statutes, where they exist at all, are generally adequate for state public health practice. 
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However, both state and federal officials suggested state laws are sometimes barriers to the 
inter-jurisdictional sharing of information and may present challenges in the future as federal 
policies promoting the electronic sharing of health-related information are implemented. 
And, federal and state key informants acknowledged that the lack of uniformity in laws and 
practices related to the acquisition, use, and storage of public health information across states 
is a source of confusion for individuals, health care providers, and government agencies. A 
universal framework for protecting the privacy of public health information may be useful or 
necessary and with health reform imminent, the development of electronic medical records, 
and a pandemic of a novel influenza virus, there may be a window of opportunity to develop 
policies supporting such a framework. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1890, United States Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandies called it the most 
important and comprehensive right—“the right to be let alone."1 This right of privacy, 
perhaps better described as a right of autonomy or self-determination, has ethical, human 
rights, and legal dimensions. Privacy has its legal roots in the United States in the language 
of the Constitution, which states that “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law.”2 There are at least two dimensions to the right of privacy. The 
first type, known as decisional privacy, is a physical right of self-determination and freedom 
from government interference reserved for fundamental issues such as child bearing and 
rearing, interstate travel, marriage, and procreation. The second type of privacy right, often 
called informational privacy, is the freedom to control the distribution of personal 
information about one’s self.  
Privacy advocates might say that the protection of these ideals is the very essence of 
the United States. But, like most rights, the right to privacy is not absolute. The right to 
privacy has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court as one that must necessarily 
be balanced with the needs of the public. This tension between private rights, particularly the 
right of privacy, and the public good is nowhere more acutely felt than in public health. 
Privacy rights can and must be curtailed in some circumstances to ensure the public’s health. 
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As the United States Supreme Court so elegantly pointed out in the famous 1905 case known 
as Jacobson v. Massachusetts involving compulsory vaccination for smallpox—  
The liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every 
person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each 
person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from 
restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is 
necessarily subject for the common good. On any other basis organized 
society could not exist with safety to its members.3  
 
If too great a number of people refuse vaccination for a communicable disease, if partners are 
not notified of their exposure to a sexually transmitted infection, or if a dangerous public 
place, such as a restaurant serving contaminated food were not closed, the public would 
suffer the health, economic, and social consequences of the spread of disease. Because it 
touches almost every aspect of public health practice in some way, legal scholar Lawrence O. 
Gostin and many other scholars have called the relationship between privacy and the public 
good the fundamental tension in public health.4 However, public health is not built solely on 
the diminution of privacy rights; public health and privacy can also have a synergist 
relationship. Trust between affected populations and government officials is critical to public 
health practice and is developed or sustained, in part, through respect of privacy and 
avoidance of unnecessary disclosure or stigmatization.  
The detection and mitigation of diseases and environmental conditions to reduce the 
impact on human health have long been recognized as possibly the most critical function of 
public health practice.5 The tension, though, between this need and privacy, especially 
informational privacy, has been particularly acute since September 11, 2001, the anthrax 
attacks in the fall of 2001, Hurricane Katrina, and the development of information 
technology that makes data available rapidly. As a consequence, policy entrepreneurs, 
particularly at the federal level, have promoted, through laws, policies, and practices, the idea 
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that widespread exchange of public health information is needed to speed the detection of, 
and response to, public health exigencies and bioterrorism.6 These policy entrepreneurs have 
acted on the premise that today’s global society with its rapid exchange of people, trade, and 
information,7 the threat of bioterrorism, and changing global demographics means that the 
rapid flow of public health information is essential to safety and health. They have argued 
that such information can help to detect, respond to, and mitigate potential harms to the 
public’s health, such as emerging infectious diseases and environmental hazards, whether 
naturally-occurring or intentional8 and flatten the epidemiology curve associated with the 
outbreak or event.  
Critics of recent federal policy developments have suggested this shift toward an 
emphasis on the more rapid sharing of information to facilitate detection and response to 
public health events has been at the expense of privacy and possibly even the broader 
purpose of public health to create the conditions that allow people to be healthy. Others wary 
of this emerging policy approach have suggested that the choice between liberty and security 
is a false one and that we need not sacrifice privacy or security for information flow. With 
this debate as context, this dissertation explores the practical aspects of the balance between 
privacy and public health interests, seeking to understand the current status of state public 
health privacy laws and practices and the perspectives of state and federal health officials 
related to that balance.  
 
Background 
Today in the United States, the responsibility for the public’s health is shared at the 
local, state, and federal levels9 and is reflected in a complex set of public health laws, 
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policies, and practices.10 Primary legal authority for the reporting and investigation of public 
health events and to protect and promote the public’s health is reserved to the states under the 
10th amendment of the Constitution.5,11 Some of the first public health laws in the United 
States were state laws requiring the reporting of vital statistics, such as births and deaths, and 
those relating to the detection and mitigation of infectious diseases such as smallpox through 
the inspection and quarantine of maritime vessels.12  
As articulated under section 301(a) of the Public Health Service Act,13 the United 
States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and its agencies, particularly the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), serve largely in a technical assistance 
and financing role for the states and responding, in practice, only when requested by state or 
local authorities or in a national event. HHS and other federal agencies conduct very little 
primary public health data collection; information about specific diseases and conditions is 
collected directly by the federal government only in very limited circumstances, such as 
where foreign or interstate travel or commerce may be affected or in multi-state outbreaks of 
disease. Public health interventions are carried out mainly at the state and local level. The 
relationship between the states and federal government in much of public health, therefore, is 
one in which the states generally retain most of the authority and responsibility for public 
health but rely on the extensive financial and technical resources of the federal government 
for support. The federal government and CDC especially, in turn, generally rely on the 
cooperation of the states to report and intervene in most public health events and request 
assistance when needed.  
This means that states and state public health laws are extremely important to public 
health practice. However, state public health laws, many of which were not amended by state 
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legislatures for a better part of the 20th Century as infectious diseases became less 
predominant, have been called antiquated and outdated by some.14 Research has suggested 
that, depending on the jurisdiction, the diseases and conditions that are reportable vary, the 
persons and organizations required to report cases or suspected cases differ, privacy 
protections for the information reported to public health are nuanced, and rules for the 
sharing of information and protecting records have a range of exceptions.5,10 The lack of 
uniformity in state laws is not necessarily undesirable when it is an expression of state 
autonomy or leads to innovation and new approaches. However, it can sometimes be 
problematic from a national perspective when it leads to significant gaps in authorities or 
programs within or across states.  
Over the past decade, the federal government has made a number of attempts to 
address various aspects of the tension between sharing public health information and 
protecting privacy. Model state laws have been developed as a means to promote a more 
national uniform approach. In 1999, around the time the Privacy Rule of the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) was being considered by Congress, the Model 
State Health Privacy Act (MSHPA) was drafted by scholars at Georgetown and Johns 
Hopkins Universities as a means to disseminate ideas about ways to update state statutes 
related to the protection of the privacy of health-related information. The MSHPA contains 
detailed language about the appropriate acquisition and use of public health information, 
terms for when disclosure of public health information is appropriate, and privacy 
infrastructure to be put in place by state health departments, and penalties for non-
compliance.  
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After the events in the fall of 2001 raised questions about the ability of government to 
detect and respond to public health emergencies, the same Georgetown and Hopkins scholars 
that led the development of the MSHPA developed a model law known as the Model State 
Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA). The MSEHPA contains provisions intended to 
enhance the capacity of the states to collect and share public health information in 
emergencies,15 although critics have argued that those provisions undermine privacy interests 
by providing the chief executive of a state too much autonomy in deciding what information 
can be collected and how it can be used. The MSEHPA set outs in detail provisions and ideas 
that would enhance or facilitate the detection of, and response to, a public health emergency 
or event. The Act was promoted by CDC as a benchmark against which states could measure 
if their laws met certain CDC preparedness objectives. The implementation of some 
provisions from the MSEHPA was encouraged or required for states applying for CDC 
public health preparedness grant funds.15  
In addition, as part of the shifting federal policy focus, Congress and the Bush 
Administration sought to improve the timeliness and sharing of some types of public health 
data and information in order to detect and respond to domestic and international infectious 
disease outbreaks and other public health emergencies through the Pandemic and All-
Hazards Preparedness Act of 2006 (PAHPA), Homeland Security Presidential Directive-21 
(HSPD-21), and other federal laws, policies, and programs. PAHPA requires HHS to, among 
other things, ensure the establishment of “a near-real-time electronic nationwide public 
health situational [sic] awareness capability,” or “system of systems” built on existing state 
surveillance capabilities.16 HSPD-21, issued by President Bush in 2007, mirrors the language 
in PAHPA, calling on HHS to build the network of systems using existing Federal, State, and 
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local surveillance systems to detect public health emergencies.17 Both HSPD-21 and 
PAHPA, in other words, could be interpreted as having significant implications for the extent 
and nature of public health information exchange. 
Although both PAHPA and HSPD-21 recognize in broad, sweeping terms the need to 
protect the privacy of identifying data and both are presumably predicated on the inclusion of 
state public health data in the network or systems, the policies themselves say nothing about 
how conflicting privacy protections across jurisdictions will be reconciled. They also say 
nothing about how the goals will be achieved under an existing set of federal laws that 
govern how some types of public health information are shared and with whom, including 
the Federal Privacy Act,18 the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA),19 and the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution.20  
The drafters of the MSHPA and MSEHPA have broadly tracked examples of 
implementation. However, changes to state laws made as a result of the two model acts or 
driven by PAHPA, HSPD-21, or other factors, have only been minimally studied. The 
variation in the laws of the 50 states governing how public health information is collected, 
used, and protected may also have important implications for achieving national objectives to 
improve surveillance and a nationwide capability that enables awareness of disease events as 
the events unfold.21 However, no analysis of state laws assessing the extent to which states 
may share public health information or to what degree that information must be protected 
exist. And, a search of the literature did not reveal any analysis of the current attitudes of 
public health leaders on the need for balance between privacy rights and disclosure of 
information for public health preparedness purposes.  
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Research Questions 
Given this, it is reasonable to ask to how state laws protect the privacy of public 
health information and whether those existing laws provide sufficient practical guidance for 
to public health practitioners. This dissertation outlines an approach to addressing these 
questions and extends the understanding of the contexts that have created the current policy 
environment. In addition to framing this understanding in terms of the federal policy context 
(i.e., federal and Constitutional civil liberties and privacy protections), this study will explain 
the extent to which enacted state laws balance the protection of the privacy of public health 
information with the need to share public health information by: 
1)  Describing state laws and policies enacted as of January 1, 2009 that govern the 
privacy protections within each state’s public health system and between each state 
and the federal government; and 
2) Assessing the understanding and perspectives of federal and state officials engaged in 
the implementation efforts related to HSPD-21 and PAHPA regarding state public 
health information sharing and privacy laws. 
 
 
Conceptual and Methodological Approaches 
 
This study is a policy study. A policy study describes policies, explains their 
existence, and evaluates them.22 One type of policy study, policy evaluation, has emerged in 
the past decade as a means to assess factors in the broader social environment that affect 
group or individual behavior. Evaluations identify, clarify, and apply criteria to determine the 
efficacy or effectiveness of a particular approach or technique.23 Policy evaluation studies 
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have been used extensively in public health practice to measure, or evaluate, the practical 
effectiveness of policies at the state or federal levels to achieve a particular purpose.24 This 
study is descriptive in nature and does not test a theory. However, I have drawn from theories 
that predict or explain the formulation of new public policies, such Kingdon’s Three Streams 
Model,25 in the final section of this document that outlines a plan for change. The idea that 
law and policy are one of many factors influencing the social environment that influences 
health, drawn from the Socio-Ecological Model, is also reflected in this dissertation.  
 
Significance 
The findings from this study have implications for how the public health system 
collects and shares data and information to perform its essential functions, especially 
emergency response and disease surveillance. The findings may also have implications for 
the call by some legal scholars over the past decade for a federal law that will protect the 
privacy of public health information similar to the way HIPAA covers certain health care-
related information. More specifically, this study also has the potential to inform efforts by 
CDC and its partners around broader efforts to encourage “legal preparedness” for 
responding to public health threats. This study may also help to inform how federalism is 
addressed in meeting the surveillance requirements in the International Health 
Regulations.26,27 Finally, the findings from this study may have implications for the 
implementation of PAHPA or HSPD-21 and could be incorporated into the federal 
implementation plans of those activities. A change in federal leadership often coincides with 
a period of agenda setting around federal policies, and it is intended that the findings from 
this study inform the direction in public health surveillance data policies.  
  
 
 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
How Public Health, Surveillance, Investigations, and Interventions are Carried Out 
Community engagement is the primary means by which public health is practiced. 
The Institute of Medicine has stated that the three core mechanisms by which public health 
achieves community engagement are: 1) assessing and monitoring the health of populations; 
2) developing policies that improve health outcomes; and, 3) assuring the health of the public 
through access to preventive and acute health care.9 Assessment and monitoring of the 
population’s health status is carried out in a variety of ways, including research, recording 
vital events (i.e., births and deaths) at the population level, and, perhaps most importantly, 
through the surveillance, investigation, and mitigation of conditions or events that impact the 
public’s health. Public health surveillance is the ongoing systematic collection, analysis, and 
interpretation of outcome-specific data for use in the planning, implementation, and 
evaluation of public health practice.28 The value of public health surveillance is closely 
linked to the timely dissemination of data and information about health events to those 
responsible for prevention and control.28 The term “biosurveillance” is now also being used 
among federal officials to describe the collection and use of human, animal, and 
environmental health surveillance data and the translation of that data into information that 
can be rapidly acted upon by decision makers and emergency response personnel to protect 
human health.  
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Both traditional public health surveillance and biosurveillance are forms of disease 
surveillance. In the United States, disease surveillance is thought to have started in 1874 in 
Massachusetts with the weekly voluntary reporting by physicians of prevalent diseases. In 
1893, the Quarantine Act authorized the United States Public Health Service to collect 
morbidity information from state and local public health authorities. Today, CDC operates 
the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS) along with tens, if not 
hundreds, of other major health-related surveillance systems, which remain largely disease-
specific.29 Disease surveillance is conducted for numerous reasons, primarily to assess the 
status of the public’s health, define public health priorities, evaluate programs, and stimulate 
research.30 Surveillance of public health conditions can also facilitate case detection, 
outbreak or problem detection, and provide early warning of infectious disease outbreaks, 
biological, or chemical terrorism and other public health emergencies.31 However, the 
usefulness of surveillance data varies with the disease and with the method by which the data 
are collected. If a condition is severe or newly emerging and primary prevention of the cause 
is possible, surveillance data collected about individual cases of disease can be useful.32 
However, if the condition or disease cannot be prevented, has a minimal health impact, or is 
endemic, surveillance methods that focus on estimating the number of cases may be more 
appropriate. Early identification, reporting, isolation, and management can slow or stop the 
spread of communicable and emerging infectious diseases, when the right conditions exist 
(e.g., good population awareness, adequate health facilities, beliefs that support reporting, 
and adequate diagnostic techniques.)33, 34  
Other uses of data generated by public health surveillance activities include: 
informing decisions by health officials about when to use public health interventions, 
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estimating disease or injury impact or burden, explaining the natural history of a health 
condition, determining the geographic distribution and spread of illness, generating 
hypotheses, evaluating the effectiveness of prevention and control measures, and facilitating 
planning.31 Although data collection usually is driven by a need to identify human cases of 
infectious disease, public health or biosurveillance data can be gathered from a wide range of 
sources. These sources include: environmental monitoring systems, animals or vector 
monitoring systems, food safety systems, individuals, laboratories, medical records, 
administrative records, police records, and vital records (e.g., birth and death certificates). 
Each source has benefits and limitations.  
There are at least five approaches to collecting public health or biosurveillance 
surveillance data: passive, active, sentinel, special systems, and statistical surveillance. These 
types of surveillance are not mutually exclusive. Passive surveillance involves reporting by 
clinical health care providers (or their animal or environmental health equivalents) when they 
diagnose a case that must be reported to the health department. Active surveillance implies 
an activity on the part of the health department, such as active outreach through telephone 
calls or visits, to encourage the reporting of cases of specific diseases.35 Active surveillance 
is used to identify cases in a known outbreak, as a method of validation for passive reporting, 
and to seek out cases of diseases that have been targeted for eradication (e.g., smallpox and 
polio).35 Sentinel surveillance is the collection of data about a particular disease from a part 
of the total population, usually a population at high risk, to identify trends.35 Special 
surveillance systems, including syndromic surveillance systems, are those that are established 
for specific purposes to find out something about point or periodic prevalence of diseases or 
conditions that are generally otherwise not reportable to the health department.35 For 
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example, where there was reason to believe the spread of an emerging infectious disease, 
such as human cases of avian influenza, might spread to a particular location, the health 
department might set up a temporary surveillance system looking only for that particular 
disease. Statistical surveillance approaches include analyzing data from public health-related 
or other sources, such as demographic surveys (e.g., the United States Census) to identify 
long-term trends in health conditions.36 Statistical surveillance is used for conditions such as 
head injuries, which are difficult and expensive to count on a case-by-case basis. To estimate 
head injuries, CDC estimates the number of cases by state or nationally using a statistical 
sample of death records and a program established in a convenience sample of hospitals to 
enable more accurate estimates to be generated. Some combination of all five approaches to 
surveillance is needed within the public health system to identify and follow the spectrum of 
diseases and conditions, naturally occurring or intentionally caused, that can impact the 
public’s health.37  
Overlapping surveillance approaches that vary depending on type of disease or 
human health hazard are necessary because monitoring the public’s health is an imperfect art. 
Collecting health-related data across the local, state, federal, and international levels is 
enormously challenging. Data can be incomplete, underreported, and not timely. Multiple 
sources of data can allow for triangulation to identify significant findings. In the US, it is 
well known that health care providers significantly underreport cases of disease. This is 
caused by a number of factors, including a lack of training in the legal requirements and 
importance of disease reporting, perceptions regarding the importance of physician-patient 
privilege, belief that reporting responsibility falls elsewhere, and the lack of incentives for 
reporting.38 Although surveillance systems do not need complete reporting to have value, 
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underreporting can distort trends, attributable risk estimates, and geographical distribution of 
cases. In addition, it can prevent the accurate assessment of potential benefits of control 
programs and prevent timely identification of disease outbreaks.39 Untimely data can also 
inhibit the detection of outbreaks or use of surveillance system data.40 For example, when the 
timeliness of the Nationally Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS) was 
evaluated, this federal system that holds voluntary state reports to CDC of particular diseases 
was found to have a time lag in receiving data from the states that ranged from 12 days for 
meningococcal disease to 40 days for pertussis. As a result, NNDSS data was found to be of 
limited use for the detection of, and response to, multistate outbreaks of infectious diseases.40 
Still NNDSS serves a different purpose; it provides a record of case counts for certain 
diseases and conditions.  
When surveillance systems, whether formal or informal or at the state or federal level, 
do detect cases or clusters of usual disease, a public health investigation may be triggered.5 A 
public health investigation involves confirming the occurrence of an outbreak through active 
data and information gathering, identifying and characterizing cases of disease, and 
developing and testing hypotheses explaining the cases, and, finally, implementing control 
measures to inhibit the further spread of the disease or condition as needed.5, 41, 42 Depending 
on the authority of the public health officials in the jurisdiction, these control measures might 
involve fining or closing a business or facility that is the source of illness or contamination, 
requiring an individual to submit to further follow-up testing for a specific disease or 
condition, requiring an individual to modify their behavior, quarantine, isolation, or 
observing that the therapeutic intervention, such as a pharmaceutical regimen, is followed. 
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Taking effective measures can also at times mean the disclosure of the name of a person or 
group of persons exposed or at risk for a particular condition.  
Because the primary legal authority for the protection and promotion of the public’s 
health is reserved to the states under the 10th amendment of the United States Constitution, 
public health surveillance, investigations, and interventions generally take place at the state 
or local level.43 The federal government does provide technical assistance to the states and 
controls significant financial resources that are distributed to conduct state public health 
activities under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.44 Direct assistance from the federal 
government in these activities may be provided when requested by the states, when state or 
local public health capacity to respond is overwhelmed, or when international travelers, 
interstate commerce, or certain agents or diseases are involved, or when the Secretary of 
HHS determines that a public health emergency exists.45,46,47 The result is a complex and 
overlapping system of public health surveillance, investigation, and response that is 
fragmented.10  
Although all states have some sort of broad statutory language that require some 
reporting of diseases of public health significance, the specific diseases and conditions 
collected by states are not uniform.48 There is no single definitive source on state disease or 
condition reporting requirements. The Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists 
(CSTE) sponsors a list of suggested reportable conditions by state that is the best available 
resource.49 Previous efforts to develop or maintain such a list or database have been 
undertaken on an as needed basis. In 1999, a survey of state and territorial epidemiologists 
was conducted to assess the states’ public health reporting requirements. The researchers 
found that only 19 of the 58 diseases and conditions on the list for national surveillance were 
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actually reportable in each of the 53 responding states and territories. In 2002, CDC released 
a study of the disease reporting laws of 54 jurisdictions to determine how many had laws 
mandating the reporting of critical biological agents disease. The study showed deficiencies 
in immediate reporting requirements for category A agents, such as anthrax, botulism, 
plague, smallpox and tularemia.50 Prior to that, according to a 1990 CDC report, a 
compilation of disease reporting requirements in the United States was last published by the 
United States Public Health Service in 1933 and 1944.51 There is also no list of the 
surveillance systems maintained by states (or the federal government) nor is there a national 
list or registry of public health interventions taken by health officials.  
 
The “Liberty-Security Trade-Off”  
While data and information sharing to protect the public’s health is legitimately 
necessary in circumstances, it is not always clear how much information is needed, by whom, 
and for what purposes.52 On the one hand, careful monitoring by modern surveillance 
systems and sharing information within public health across levels of government supported 
the early detection of new and resurgent infectious disease threats, including well known 
examples such Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)53 and the early detection of 
food-borne outbreaks.54 Effective public health emergency planning, prevention, and 
response can promote the communication and the sharing of information between various 
entities, ranging from public health authorities and health care workers to national security 
and law enforcement officials to the judiciary.55,56 On the other hand, sharing too much 
information with law enforcement, for example, has the potential to undermine the public’s 
trust that public health will protect health information, probably the most sensitive of any 
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information about an individual, and use it only for the purpose for which it was collected.57 
Unauthorized disclosure of health information can result in stigma, loss of health care, 
employment discrimination for affected persons.58  
Scholars argued that this tension between the disclosure of public health data and 
information and the privacy and liberty interests of individuals and communities,59 referred 
to by some as the “liberty-security trade-off,” is one of the most fundamental tensions in 
public health.4, 60 While that tension has always been present to some extent in civil societies, 
since John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty and Warren and Brandeis’s famous article “The Right to 
Privacy” were published, American has placed increasing value on liberty interests and 
protecting the privacy interests of citizens from government intrusion.1, 57, 61 The emphasis 
placed on those values has conflicted over the past 10 years with a perceived renewed threat 
of bioterrorism that sometimes appears to justify surveillance of all types and with the 
development of information technology that makes it easier than ever to collect and share 
information previously protected by relative obscurity.62  
Informational privacy is about competing interests. It is about the “the claim of 
individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how and to what extent 
information about them is communicated to others.”63, 64 Privacy and public health advocates 
disagree over the extent to which the public health need for data should override the 
informational privacy rights of individuals.65 While privacy protections may help to promote 
the public’s health by encouraging individuals to fully utilize health services, they can also 
simultaneously be used to prevent data sharing that could improve the public’s health.66, 67, 68 
For example, spatially-based methods of public health surveillance that use precise patient 
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locations to detect outbreaks yield more accurate results than those that do not use exact 
patient location. Those methods, however, also pose a greater risk to privacy.69 ,70  
According to legal scholar Larry Gostin, “significant levels of privacy cannot 
realistically be achieved within the current health information infrastructure,” leaving public 
health with a “hard choice” about whether to limit what information is collected in the name 
of privacy or collect the information in the name of public health.57 Some privacy advocates 
argue that public health surveillance inhibits the clinical freedom of health care providers by 
requiring providers to interact with health departments. They also contend that public health 
surveillance limits patient autonomy and disproportionately affects the poor and minorities.71 
These advocates argue that health care providers should have the ability to decide when, if at 
all, to report a case of a disease or illness, depending on what the provider feels is in the best 
interest of the patients. They also believe that patient autonomy is threatened by a loss of 
control over personal information sent by a provider to a health department. And they 
suggest that the poor and minorities, who are disproportionately burdened by disease and 
poor health conditions, are most likely to have their health conditions reported to the health 
department.  
Often without directly refuting these arguments, public health advocates argue that 
privacy, clinical medicine, and public health practice are, or can be, synergistic. Public health 
advocates contend that only by clinical providers making the public health system aware of 
cases and conditions and allowing experts in the field of population-based interventions to 
become involved in cases of disease, can the health of all people be adequately protected. 
The parable of the “tragedy of the commons,” in which a common pasture in a village is 
destroyed when no common governance structure exists to limit the self-interests of 
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individuals, is often invoked as an analogy to explain the importance of government in 
making difficult choices about limiting privacy interests or private rights to promote the 
public’s health.72 Public health advocates believe that privacy protections, if granted in 
degree and limited only when absolutely necessary, breed trust. In turn, they argue, this trust 
enables public health.  
Debate continues as to whether risks to privacy, especially the privacy of vulnerable 
and special populations, “justify less accurate but still adequate reporting systems.” 73 Case 
reporting has been used as a tool for centuries within public health practice to control 
sexually transmitted infections. However, in the past half century, fear of stigma and 
discrimination led to a decade of very public and passionate debate in the United States 
between public health advocates, affected populations, and civil libertarians over the 
possibility of named reporting of HIV cases.73, 74 Where case reporting does take place for 
certain diseases, privacy advocates have even challenged the sharing of that data within the 
same agency. Anecdotal reports have suggested that linking HIV and TB data is prohibited in 
some jurisdictions. Inter-jurisdictional data sharing is even more controversial, with 
occupational and environmental surveillance professionals, reportedly expressing concerns 
about data sharing across governments even for public health purposes.75 Very little evidence 
is available, however, about the prevalence of attitudes or concerns about privacy and public 
health among the public or public health leaders.  
 
A Post Sept 11 Federal Preparedness Policy Paradigm 
Despite the challenges, for decades state and local public health departments have 
collected a vast array of important and useful data and information. Public health has 
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exchanged that information with federal health officials, clinical providers, and others to 
carry out the functions of the public health system.75 However, the events in the Fall of 2001, 
including the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the anthrax attack 
on buildings and individuals in Florida and the Washington, D.C. area, led many people and 
policy makers to conclude that early warnings through better surveillance and faster response 
could be achieved by putting the vast array of information collected at the state and local 
level into the hands of more people at all levels of government.76 This paradigm was 
reinforced by the public health crises associated with the rapid global spread of Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003 and Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Over the same time 
period, wireless technologies became broadly accessible to the public and government, 
raising expectations that information is always available and messages can be widely 
disseminated at any time.  
While most public health practitioners agree that some measure of information 
sharing is intuitively important in some circumstances, little empirical evidence is available 
on the value of sharing personally identifiable information held by health departments, 
especially sharing that information outside public health agencies. But exigencies and fear, 
which are often the motivating factor for rapid policy development, resulted in a major 
infusion of federal resources and focus on establishing methods and mechanisms for 
widespread mandates for sharing health-related information and other information that might 
detect or prevent terrorism or disasters.76 This shift was expressed in several important 
federal policy initiatives. The Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act of 2006 
(PAHPA), passed in 2006, includes a provision that amends the Public Health Service Act. 
The provision calls for the enhancement of disease monitoring efforts and the sharing of the 
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data and information from those efforts across the United States at the state, local, tribal, 
territorial, and federal levels. 77 The Act further calls on the Secretary of HHS to establish, in 
collaboration with State, local, and tribal public health officials, “a near real-time electronic 
nationwide public health situational awareness capability through an interoperable network 
of systems to share data and information to enhance early detection of rapid response to, and 
management of, potentially catastrophic infectious disease outbreaks and other public health 
emergencies that originate domestically or abroad.” It requires that this network be built on 
or enhance existing State surveillance systems. 
Mirroring the language in PAHPA, the executive policy document known as 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-21 (HSPD-21), provides that HHS will build the 
network of systems using existing Federal, State, and local surveillance systems and to 
provide incentives to establish local surveillance systems where systems do not currently 
exist.17 HSPD-21, which was issued in 2007, provides for collaboration across HHS and 
other federal agencies to establish a plan to develop the network. HSPD-21 also sets forth 
other guiding principles for the development of the network, including the need for the 
network to be: flexible, timely, and comprehensive; protect individually identifiable data, and 
incorporate data into a nationally shared understanding of current bio-threats and events.  
Interestingly, both PAHPA and HSPD-21 followed the establishment of another 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive, HSPD-10, which outlined the Executive Branch’s 
Biodefense Strategy for the 21st Century.78 In HSPD-10, it was the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) rather than HHS that was called on to develop a nation-wide system that 
would permit early warning of a biological event. The transfer of this responsibility to HHS 
seems to reflect a changing understanding by policy makers of the respective roles of the two 
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agencies and the complexity of human health surveillance. In 2002, the Bush administration 
proposed to move several major bioterrorism programs, totaling more than 4 billion dollars 
and including the Strategic National Stockpile, from CDC to the Department of Homeland 
Security.79 This was a significant departure from the previous recommendations of the 
United States Commission on National Security and the first of several policy actions by the 
Bush administration that signaled Homeland Security was the lead agency in any emergency 
response, including public health events such as pandemic influenza. HSPD-21, while 
possibly an anomaly, may represent a shift in thinking about the respective roles and 
responsibilities of Homeland Security and HHS in public health emergency response.  
The idea that a shared understanding of public health is critical can also be found in 
other recent policies developed outside and inside the public health domain. In the final 
report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, commonly 
known as the 9/11 Report, the Commission reflected on the need for government to draw on 
all relevant sources of information to protect the public, including public health 
information.80 When the United States became a party to the revised International Health 
Regulations (IHR), the United States agreed to participate in a global system of information 
exchange to detect public health emergencies of international concern.81,82 The IHR is an 
international agreement that requires parties to develop the nation-wide surveillance capacity 
to detect, assess and report to the World Health Organization certain public health events and 
conditions, such as the recent outbreak of the novel H1N1 influenza virus.  
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Current State and Federal Privacy Law  
The legal landscape around the right to informational privacy is complex. The United 
States Constitution, with its negative design that establishes limits on government 
interference rather than expressing a positive list of rights, offers a limited right to privacy 
but does not impart a broad expectation of informational privacy. The courts have found 
exceptions to the procedural and substantive due process rights imparted under the 5th and 
14th amendments. These exceptions permit the collection and disclosure of personal 
information by the federal government and the states, respectively, when they are in the 
public’s interest.83, 84 In Whalen v. Roe, the Supreme Court limited informational privacy 
rights by upholding a New York State statute that allowed the state health department to 
maintain a centralized database with personally identifiable information of persons who had 
received a controlled substances prescription. And, in another case, Planned Parenthood of 
Central Missouri v. Danforth, the Court upheld a state law requiring reporting of data to the 
State on late-term abortions.85  
However, in contrast, in Whalen v. Roe, the Court also acknowledged the bounds of 
government actions involving public health information. The Court held that a state public 
health statute may still violate a right to privacy if an “unbounded and large number of 
government employees” have access to the information, even if it adequately protects against 
public disclosure of a patient’s private information.86 And, in a 2004 case the 9th Circuit 
Court of Appeals decided that Arizona’s abortion law violated patients’ information privacy 
rights by requiring the “unnecessary” release of identifiable patient records to the public. 87 In 
other words, the mandatory reporting or collection of disease does not violate Constitutional 
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privacy rights but only so long as the collected information is subject to safeguards that 
protect the information from unnecessary disclosures to the public or too great a number of 
government employees. The United States Supreme Court has not fully detailed what 
safeguards would be adequate or what might comprise the full litmus test for necessity of 
disclosure. It is therefore not clear what Constitutional standards might be used to determine 
when the collection, use, and disclosure of identifiable or potentially identifiable health 
information by public health departments are appropriate.  
In addition to the Constitutional provisions, there are also other federal laws and 
policies that comprise the legal landscape for the sharing and protection of public health 
information. These include the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),88 the Privacy Act of 
1974,89 the HHS Human Subject Protection Regulations,90 the E-Government Act of 2002, 91 
the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA),92 the CDC-ATSDR Policy on the 
Release of Data,93 the Federal Drug and Alcohol Confidentiality provisions,94 and the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). FOIA guarantees public 
access to federal agency records or information, with some exceptions for certain types of 
information, upon written request.88 The Privacy Act of 1974 protects the privacy of certain 
individually identifiable information maintained in federal systems.89 A statutory provision 
known as the “Common Rule” provides the authority for the HHS Human Subject Protection 
Regulations and protects human subjects research data.90 Although less applicable to most 
types of public health data and information, the E- Government Act sets out confidentiality 
protections that apply to all individually identifiable statistical data held by certain federal 
agencies.91 FERPA is a federal law that limits the disclosure of student educational records, 
including the health-related information, contained in those records.92 Federal statutes and 
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regulations strictly prohibit the disclosure of medical records related to federally-funded drug 
and alcohol treatment, which includes virtually all substance abuse and mental health 
treatment programs, for almost all reasons except payment.94 The CDC-ATSDR Policy on 
Release of Data covers the release of CDC surveillance data sets for public health purposes.95 
The HIPAA Privacy Rule is perhaps the most often cited federal law in discussions 
about the privacy of health information. The Rule establishes a comprehensive, national 
minimum standard for restricting the use and disclosure of certain individually-identifiable 
health-related data or information, or “protected health information (PHI).” Entities required 
to comply with the rule, known as “covered entities,” include all health care providers, 
insurers, some government programs, and their business associates that conduct electronic 
transactions. Notably, however, public health authorities are not covered entities. The Rule 
establishes a presumption of non-disclosure and requires covered entities to engage in a 
number of practices to protect PHI, including establishing systematic safeguards to protect 
PHI, and accounting for each disclosure of PHI. Disclosures of PHI are allowed without 
individual authorization in the following instances: treatment by health care providers, to 
avert a threat to health or safety, to public health authorities for public health purposes, to 
protect national security, to law enforcement under certain conditions, and for judicial or 
administrative proceedings.96 Although public health authorities are not covered entities and 
may readily receive data from covered entities under disclosure exceptions, HIPAA is an 
important piece of the legal landscape for the sharing of public health information because 
much of the data collected by public health authorities for biosurveillance purposes is 
obtained from covered entities.97 And the disclosure accounting requirement of HIPAA has 
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been cited, although inaccurately, by health care providers and hospitals as one rationale for 
reluctance to participate in federal surveillance programs.98  
Under the Constitution, the federal government also may regulate the public’s health 
through specific powers, such as the power to regulate interstate commerce and the power to 
direct how federal funds, including those given to states under grants and cooperative 
agreements, may be spent.44 However, federal law does not complete the picture; state laws 
are also an important part of the legal landscape for the sharing of public health information 
for bioterrorism preparedness and other purposes.99 Under HIPAA, more stringent state 
privacy and confidentiality laws, including those that provide special protections for specific 
diseases (i.e. HIV/AIDS-related information) are not preempted. And, more broadly, all 
powers not specifically delegated to the federal government in the Constitution, including the 
police power, are reserved to the states,11, 100 meaning state privacy laws remain an important 
consideration.5  
Legal scholars have reported that most states do not have comprehensive laws 
protecting the privacy of health information. Instead, these scholars consider state laws to be 
“antiquated” because the laws describe the collection and regulation of information based on 
specific data recipients or particular data sources.101, 102 Anecdotal analysis indicate that state 
laws also treat some kinds of public health information as especially confidential, an 
approach known as “exceptionalism,” and allow broad sharing of other types of public health 
information. Legal scholars and privacy advocates have argued that state laws do not 
effectively balance competing individual interests in privacy with the need to share public 
health data and information for the common good.103 Both public health advocates and 
privacy advocates have called for clearer privacy protections for state public health 
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information and suggested that HIPAA may offer a precedent for requiring privacy 
protections in public health information systems.52, 66 
 
Initiatives to Address State Public Health Privacy Issues 
Many attempts have been made to acknowledge and address this purported imbalance 
at the state level between privacy interests and the need to share public health data and 
information. In 1988, the Institute of Medicine recognized the importance of the role of law 
in assuring the public’s health by calling for states to review their public health codes.10 In 
the late 1990s, the Model State Public Health Privacy Act was drafted by scholars at 
Georgetown and Johns Hopkins University to address the fact that as increasing amounts of 
identifiable public health data are gathered, stored, and exchanged, if privacy is not 
maintained, individuals may suffer embarrassment, stigma, and discrimination.102 In 2000, 
funded by the Kellogg Foundation and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, the Turning 
Point Public Health Statute Modernization Collaborative, a collaborative of five states and 
several national organizations, developed the Model State Public Health Act as a tool for 
state, local, and tribal governments to use to modernize their public health codes.104 Then, in 
the wake of the events in the fall of 2001, CDC funded the development of the Model State 
Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA), which built upon Turning Point’s Model State 
Public Health Act, to provide states with a guide for updating their public health laws relative 
to bioterrorism and emergency preparedness.105, 106, 107  
The MSEHPA, however, was somewhat controversial. It was a part of a broader 
CDC-initiated approach to law and bioterrorism referred to as “public health legal 
preparedness.” Public health legal preparedness is, in part, the widely acknowledged idea that 
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an essential component of preparing for bioterrorism events, infectious disease outbreaks, 
and public health emergencies is the development of legal authorities that allow public health 
officials to coordinate across jurisdictions, agencies, and sectors.108, 109, 110 While intended to 
serve as a benchmark for states lawmakers to assess their public health laws with regard to 
terrorism and emergency preparedness, state officials were reportedly strongly encouraged to 
enact part of the CDC’s MSEHPA to demonstrate that their bioterrorism response plans were 
sufficient to qualify for federal bioterrorism preparedness cooperative agreement funds.52, 111 
Although the drafters of the MSEHPA likely intended it to balance public health powers and 
the need to share information with individual liberty interests, critics argue that the section 
that addresses the sharing of public health information, Section 303, was overly broad and 
did not go far enough in protecting privacy.106 A 2005 article finds that thirty-three states 
passed some form of new law that included some or part of the language from the Model, but 
that many did not include language from Article 3 of the MESHPA and others adopted only 
small parts of the Act.52 Another report written by the authors of the MSEHPA states that “as 
of July 31, 2006, 38 states had passed statutes that reflect the principles enunciated in 
MSEHPA.”107 I could find no information in the public domain about what specific 
provisions within the MSEHPA have been adopted by any particular state.  
The results of the Model law efforts have never been independently evaluated and its 
impact on state law, in particular, has not been fully described. Experts in the field have 
argued that although important progress in legal preparedness has been made, no state is fully 
legally prepared to respond to a major public health threat. They have also suggested that the 
ability to detect and report a disease outbreak is not uniformly strong across the states.112 The 
United States has even indicated that federalism may affect its compliance with surveillance 
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and reporting requirements of the International Health Regulations.113,114 Legal experts have 
called for state legislatures to “revisit already enacted laws to incorporate comprehensive 
privacy safeguards for the collection, use, and storage of information collected by public 
health departments.”52  
 
Rationale for this Study 
The extent to which states have achieved an overall balance in their public health 
laws between liberty interests and the need to share information or the extent to which state 
laws related to the privacy of public health information enable public health leaders the 
flexibility they need to carry out their functions has not been documented. This study 
describes how well state laws achieve that balance, by: 1) examining the status of state laws 
and policies (as of January 1, 2009) to describe their content related to the sharing of 
information about potential disease outbreaks and other public health events within each 
state’s public health system, between law enforcement and public health within each state, 
and between each state and the federal government; and 2) assessing the understanding and 
perspectives of federal and state officials engaged in the implementation efforts around 
HSPD-21 and PAHPA of state public health information sharing and privacy laws.  
  
 
 
 
 
STUDY DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Quantitative methods can be very useful for measuring a phenomenon.115 Qualitative 
methods, however, are most appropriate for exploring an issue that cannot be measured using 
scales or quantities. Qualitative methods allow for the identification of themes that emerge 
from narrative data. The purpose of this study is to better understand the following:  
• What is currently in state public health privacy laws? 
• To what extent do current laws reflect key provisions found in the Model Acts?  
• Do state privacy laws meet the needs of public health practitioners today? 
• Are privacy laws likely to meet the needs of public health practitioners in the 
future?  
• Are privacy laws barriers or facilitators in achieving public health surveillance, 
preparedness, and response information exchange objectives? 
• Is federalism understood as compatible with those same objectives? 
• Is the way in which public health leaders understand privacy law aligned with 
existing laws?  
Almost all of the research that has been done on the subject of this study, which has been 
limited, has been qualitative in nature. This is probably because laws, and our understanding 
of them, are social constructs and quantitative measurement of those constructs often has 
little meaning.  
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Two qualitative methods were concurrently applied in this study. I used policy 
analysis methods to capture a “point-in-time” snapshot of relevant state public health 
informational privacy laws in effect as of June 1, 2008. To do this, I collected policies from 
an online database (Westlaw) containing primary legal authorities for the 50 states and the 
federal government116 and the public health-related provisions in those statutes were 
compared with the recommended provisions found in the Model State Health Privacy Act 
(MSHPA). In addition, I conducted a total of 14 key informant interviews with federal and 
state public health leaders, including state health officials, attorneys, privacy officials, and 
federal officials engaged in the issue of public health information exchange. Descriptions of 
each method are presented below.  
 
Conceptual Approach 
This study, which was designed to generate a descriptive theory of public health 
informational privacy law, is a policy study. Such studies describe policies, explain their 
existence, and evaluate them117 by drawing on multiple approaches, techniques, frameworks, 
and theories, including policy analysis, evaluation techniques. Policy evaluation, a type of 
policy study, has emerged in the past decade as a means to assess factors in the broader social 
environment that affect group or individual behavior. Policy evaluation studies measure the 
status of state laws and have been used primarily by the federal government and by national 
organizations to assess the need for, and evaluate, nation-wide programs intended to achieve 
public health goals through policy change such as the reduction of tobacco use or the 
increase of physical activity.24 For example, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) has used 
measures of state policy as an variable in a broader evaluation of the American Stop 
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Smoking Intervention Study,118 CDC has evaluated state policies as part of the State Tobacco 
Activities Tracking and Evaluation System to measure state progress toward tobacco control 
objectives,119 and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation has funded policy evaluation 
activities as a component of its “Bridging the Gap: Research Informing Practice and Policy 
for Healthy Youth Behavior” project.120 Policy studies can be formative in nature or can 
serve as the basis for impact analysis or studies of the correlation between policies and 
particular outcomes. 
 
Study Design 
In this study, two concurrent qualitative methods were used. The first method, policy 
evaluation, was conducted in order to determine the status of current state laws. The second 
method, key informant interviews, was intended to complement those findings and develop a 
richer understanding of public health informational privacy law.  
 
Method 1: Statutory Analysis 
Purpose. In order to assess the nature and extent of existing state privacy laws, I 
attempted to systematically identify, and analyze relevant state statutes, as well as case law 
and regulations where applicable. Because laws are essentially narratives, attempting to 
quantify them is very difficult and is of limited application.  
Data Collection. This study collected state statutes in effect as of January 1, 2009, 
using an online, electronic system containing primary legal authorities for the 50 states 
(Westlaw).116 I opted to collect the statutes rather than conduct a survey or identify state laws 
by other means because other studies have demonstrated that legal research, performed in 
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conjunction with secondary research methods, such as surveys or interviews, is the most 
accurate means to ascertain the status of public policies.121 The laws captured in this study 
were human health-related only. Although animal and environmental health information is 
important to public health and may be considered public health information in some contexts, 
privacy considerations in those domains are limited. Within the laws related to human health, 
the types of provisions to be captured included laws related to the use of public health 
investigations and surveillance information; open records and freedom of information act-
type laws; laws specifically related to the privacy, confidentiality, disclosure or release of 
human health data; and laws related to disease reporting.  
Standard legal research methods used and tested in other public health policy studies 
were applied in this study.120, 122, 123,124 To identify and collect the provisions, the current, 
official, un-annotated versions of all state’s statutes and constitution were searched using a 
sequence of three searches. Initially, the annotated state statutes, which contain notes about 
how the courts have interpreted the statutes, were used for the searches. After those searches 
yielded an excessive number of results, largely because it appeared that some of the terms 
commonly appeared in court decisions related to the introduction of evidence in criminal 
matters, the searches were conducted again using the un-annotated versions. In the final 
analysis of the statutes, the annotated versions were consulted to identify any applicable case 
law or regulations. In the first search, the text of the annotated statutes was searched using a 
series of Boolean search strings. In the second search, a scan of the table of contents was 
conducted, focusing on the titles within each state’s code containing the health, criminal and 
state government statutes. These titles were reviewed for terms in the titles of either chapters 
or sections within the code that are similar to those used in the Boolean search strings. In the 
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third search, a natural language search using the phrase “disclosure of public health 
information” was conducted.  
To confirm the findings, the list of statutes was compared against secondary data 
sources, such as the 50 state surveys on some topics that are provided by the online legal 
research database provider, the National Conference of State Legislatures websites, and 
reports of laws found in the literature. Although there were secondary sources that cover 
various aspects of this analysis in part or in whole, no existing source exists covering the 
entirety of the subject of this study. And, although they can be helpful in identifying any gaps 
or missed categories of laws, secondary sources of legal information are not always accurate 
or complete.121 The secondary sources and the primary research conducted for this study 
contained similar results. As such, secondary sources were helpful in confirming that I had 
not overlooked statutes that should have been included in my analysis.  
Coding and Analysis. Drawing from the Model State Health Privacy Act (MSHPA) 
and the Model Emergency State Health Powers Act (MESHPA) and from ideas reflected in 
the literature about the nature of public health privacy, I developed a preliminary list of 
content to be captured through the analysis before the study was initiated (Table 1: List of 
Privacy Protections and Information Sharing Provisions) that, after reviewing the statutes 
from a subset of states, I narrowed to 12 total categories for coding purposes. Of the total 
categories or types of provisions I indentified for inclusion in the final analysis, 7 were drawn 
from the literature: general presumption of privacy or non-disclosure (PRESNONDIS); 
exceptions to non-disclosure for research or statistical analysis (EXRESEARCH), contract 
tracing or partner notification purposes (EXCONTRACE), or to protect public health 
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(EXPROPH); and exceptional or special treatment for HIV (ISMHIV), STDS (ISMSTD), or 
other specific disease information (ISMOTH).    
 I used the Model Acts as a source for my decision-making about what to analyze 
because they represent the only sources of statutory language related to public health privacy 
and public health emergencies that I could identify and that has been recommended by public 
health and legal experts. However, after examination, I concluded neither Model Act 
provided an ideal set of provisions against which to compare state laws. On the one hand, the 
Model Acts were incomplete and arguably outdated. On the other hand, the Model Acts are 
highly, and perhaps overly, detailed. Both Acts contained a variety of provisions not specific 
to the subject of inquiry for this study.  
Therefore, I focused my analysis only on the provisions in MSHPA that address the 
duties and obligations of health departments, the acquisition of public health information, and 
fair information practices as they relate to health departments. The MSHPA proposes model 
language on the duties and obligations of health departments that include: a duty to hold 
information secure; provisions that restrict the use of information to those consistent with 
original legitimate public health purposes; requirements to de-identify protected health 
information; authorizing language for the establishment of public health information officer 
or a privacy officer; and provisions about when public reports containing health information 
can be released. The MSHPA also suggests model language indicating that certain types of 
personally identifiable health information are not for public disclosure, require informed 
consent prior to certain types of disclosure, allow for disclosure of information to the federal 
government and law enforcement, address the availability of information about deceased 
individuals, and restrict secondary disclosures. To complete my final analysis, I developed 
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three variables or categories to measure the presence or absence of these types of provisions 
in state laws: public disclosure of records (MSHPAPUB), permissible disclosure to federal 
authorities (MSHPAFED), secondary disclosure (MSHPASECOND).   
The MESHPA, which focuses on public health emergencies, recommends model 
statutory language for states to ensure health officials have the authority to declare and 
control a public health emergency, including provisions around disease reporting for the 
detection of an emergency and sharing of information during a declared public health 
emergency. I looked at the extent to which state laws reflected the provisions in Section 303 
of the MSEHPA. Part C of Section 303 addresses the exchange of information between law 
enforcement and public health authorities. It provides that public health authorities should 
report cases of disease possibly caused by bioterrorism to public safety authorities and that 
the sharing of information between public health and public safety authorities is restricted to 
the information necessary for the treatment, control, investigation, and prevention of a public 
health emergency. I developed two categories or variables to measure the presence or 
absence of these types of provisions in state laws: reporting or disclosure of suspect cases of 
disease related to bioterrorism to law enforcement (MESHPABTLE), and explicit limitations 
on disclosure to law enforcement (MESHPALIMLE).   
After completing the searches for the provisions, each statute was recorded. A table 
was created to capture the substance of each state’s provisions across all the relevant 
sections. To analyze each statute, the text was read for its plain meaning, enacted and 
effective dates, legislative and administrative history, and, where applicable, annotations. 
Where annotations referred to a relevant administrative language or case, those documents 
were retrieved and coded, and the implications of those documents captured and recorded in  
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Table 1. Preliminary List of Privacy Protections and Information Sharing Provisions 
Duties and Obligations of Health Departments 
• Duty to hold information secure 
• Uses consistent with original legitimate public health purposes 
• De-identifying protected health information 
• Establishment of public health information officer 
• Issuance of public reports 
 
Acquisition and Use of Public Health Information 
• Definition of protected health information 
• Acquisition of protected health information 
• Broad requirement for reporting of known or suspect public health events 
• Acquisition through syndromic surveillance systems 
• State/local exchange of information about of reported events 
 
Access to and Disclosure of Protected Health Information 
• Non-public information 
• Scope of disclosures 
• Requirement for informed consent 
• Permissible disclosures without informed consent 
• Disclosure to the federal government 
• Disclosure to law enforcement 
• Permissible disclosures for criminal or civil judicial proceedings 
• Effect of emergency declaration on privacy practices 
• Deceased individuals 
• Secondary disclosures 
• Record-keeping of disclosures 
• Exceptions for certain disease information (e.g., HIV, genetic information, etc.) 
 
Fair Information Practices  
• Individual access to protected health information 
• Limitations concerning individual access to protected health information 
• Accuracy of information 
• Right to appeal violations of fair information practices 
 
Criminal Sanctions and Civil Remedies for Violations of State Law 
• Criminal penalties 
• Civil enforcement 
• Civil remedies 
• Immunities 
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the notes field of the table. Where sections of statutes conflicted, rules of statutory (or 
regulatory) construction and legislative interpretation were applied. The relevant sections 
were grouped by themes that emerged through the course of reading the statutes and 
compared with one another.  
Quality Assurance. Time and budget constraints did not permit double searching or 
double coding of the statutes by a second person with experience in statutory analysis, the 
gold standard in these types of analyses. To some extent, the statutory analysis conducted for 
this study might be considered an art rather than a science because it is based on an approach 
to statutory analysis that is taught in law schools. There are likely aspects of reading and 
analyzing statute that, short of providing explicit detail about rules for statutory interpretation 
could only be easily repeated by another researcher with a legal background.  
The findings from the statutory analysis were reviewed and additional analysis 
conducted based on findings from the key informant interviews and compared with 
secondary sources or lists of state privacy laws available in the literature. It is possible this 
method of analysis could have resulted in missed statutes. The method was intended to 
provide a snapshot of the general status of state laws that would allow for the identification 
of themes and common approaches in state laws, not a catalog of all state policies. 
 
Method 2: Key Informant Interviews 
Purpose. Key informant interviews were conducted with federal and state public 
health leaders for several reasons. First, and most importantly, the interviews were conducted 
to find out what these public health leaders thought about state public health privacy or the 
implementation of current federal priorities found in policies like HSPD-21 and PAHPA that 
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might, depending on how they are implemented, impact public health informational privacy. 
Second, the interviews were conducted in order to determine whether relevant state laws has 
been captured through the statutory analysis and whether there were any practical issues 
associated with enforcement or application of those laws and policies that could not be 
determined through the statutory analysis.  
Key Informant Selection and Recruitment. Key informants were selected to represent 
both federal and state public health leadership perspectives. Initially, I proposed a very 
specific and structured approach to identifying and recruiting key informants, suspecting that 
I might face considerable challenges in identifying enough people willing to discuss such a 
sensitive topic. State and federal officials are public servants and, depending on the 
administration under which they are serving, can face serious repercussions for statements 
they make in the course of their public or private lives. As a result, federal and state officials 
can be very reluctant to discuss their opinions. In the course of this study, my concerns about 
willingness to participate was generally unfounded.  
For the interviews with federal officials, participants were recruited from various 
federal interagency, national, and agency-specific working groups and projects addressing 
the exchange of human health information. The potential interviewees were contacted via 
email using a form recruitment email explaining the study, the confidentiality, and the nature 
of the interview requested. Those emails, if they received a response, resulted in a series of 
either emails or telephone calls to answer further questions about the nature of the study and 
schedule the interview. I conducted a total of five interviews with federal officials at two 
different federal departments who are or were involved in the effort to promote the near real-
time exchange of public health information.125 Participants at the federal level were quite 
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willing to participate; five of the first six people I approached agreed to be interviewed. This 
high rate of agreement may have been due to their professional investment in the subject 
matter. The interviewees included two medical doctors, two epidemiologists, and one policy 
official. Three interviewees worked in the headquarters of their Department and two worked 
at the agency level. 
Recruitment of state public health officials was more complex. Initially, for this study 
state-level key informants were to be recruited using a directory of senior state public health 
officials maintained by the State Health Leadership Initiative.126 Initially, I planned to 
conduct a total of 9 interviews at the state level, with one interview at each of the three states 
with the least comprehensive state policies, in each of the three states ranked the most 
comprehensive, and in three middle states. If the state health official for one of the targeted 
states was unavailable to be interviewed, the next state in the ranking list was to be contacted.  
I encountered two challenges in attempting to carry out this approach. First, the state 
statutory analysis did not identify states that had clearly more or less comprehensive laws. 
Instead, the statutory analysis yielded patterns of differences and similarities in privacy laws 
that resulted in groups of states but not an easy method of ranking the states, thus making it 
difficult to select states using the initially envisioned method. Second, emailed recruitment 
letters (Appendix A) sent to the principal state health official for 15 states yielded a limited 
response; only 3 of the 15 states). There are several possible explanations for the low 
response rate to the initial mailing. State health officials in the states might simply have been 
unwilling to participate in an interview with a student or an attorney. They may also have 
been too busy to participate, given that the study took place during what is the regular 
legislative session for each state. Or they may have been unable to participate during what 
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was a time when states were facing a severe fiscal crisis, which in some cases resulted in 
furlough of key state employees that might have otherwise participated in an interview. 
Another explanation for the relatively low response rate is that the state officials may have 
felt uncomfortable discussing the topic of privacy law or preparedness.  
When the recruitment was expanded to a second group of states selected for their 
geographic diversity as well as diversity of legal approaches to the issue of public health 
privacy, and the invitations were extended to state privacy officials and state health 
department legal or legislative counsel, as well as state health officers, 5 more state officials 
readily agreed to participate for a total of 8 states.  Of the interviewees, two were in positions 
of scientific authority in their state public health agencies, four were in legal or policy 
positions, and two maintained dual roles. They were from states that were geographically, 
demographically, legally, and politically diverse. One mid-Atlantic state (Maryland), one 
southeastern state (North Carolina), one iron-belt state (Ohio), two mid-western states 
(Arkansas and North Dakota), one southwestern state (New Mexico), and two states in the 
western United States (Oregon and Washington) were represented in the interviews. 
According to data from the exit polls conducted by a national news organization during the 
2004 and 2008 Presidential elections, three interviewees were located in states that were 
carried twice by the Democratic candidate, three were in states carried once by the 
Democratic candidate and once by the Republican candidate, and two were in states were 
carried twice by the Republican candidate.127  
A senior leader on public health surveillance issues for a national professional 
association of public health officials also participated, for a total of 14 interviews. Of the 14, 
at least 8 possessed doctoral degrees (Table 2. Key Informant Interviewees by Profession).  
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On average, the interviewees possessed approximately 15 years of public health experience. 
All of the interviewees had an active role in either the collection of public health data or 
decision-making about the use of information in a response to a public health event.  
 
Table 2. Key Informant Interviewees by Profession 
Profession Number of Interviewees 
Attorneys/Privacy Officers 7
Epidemiologists/ Medical Doctors 4
Senior Public Health Management Officials 3
  
Data Collection. A semi-structured telephone interview lasting based on a discussion 
guide and prompts were used to collect responses from key informants. The interviews were 
scheduled in advance to take place at a time and place convenient to the interviewee. 
Extensive handwritten notes were taken during the call and the interviews were electronically 
recorded with permission from the participants.  
One set of questions about the sharing of data and information was initially planned 
for both federal and state officials but after conducting one interview it became clear that the 
interview responses given by state and federal officials would diverge so greatly that prompts 
specific to each of group were needed in the discussion guide, effectively resulting in two 
discussion guides (Appendices B and C). Both sets of interviews focused on what laws and 
policies, if any, impact the ability of officials to receive or disclose public health data and 
information to public health officials in other jurisdictions. For the interviews with federal 
officials, prompts were used about the direction of federal policy initiatives to promote the 
real time sharing of public health information. For state officials, specific prompts and 
questions about their state’s laws, such as what factors they saw as influencing the 
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development of law and questions about future opportunities to improve the state’s laws were 
asked. A hybrid of the prompts from both discussion guides was used to interview the 
individual from the national public health professional association.  
During the interviews, questions were added or deleted to reflect the information the 
participants had already provided and to keep the interview to the scheduled time. The 
interviews varied between 30 and 60 minutes depending on how much time the interviewee 
had available and how long it took to move through the questions. As individuals agreed to 
the interviews and the interviews were underway, it became clear that some were eager to 
discuss a variety of issues related to privacy and federal preparedness policy beyond what I 
initially expected. Although I felt that due to IRB approval I could not dramatically alter or 
evolve the line of questions during the interview to utilize a true grounded theory 
approach,115 I did not discourage responses that delved into other related topics because those 
responses might be meaningful to understanding how the participants thought about and 
related to the issue of privacy and privacy law.  
Protection of Human Subjects. This study was approved by the UNC Institutional 
Review Board (IRB). Because of the sensitive nature of the topic and the potential 
repercussions for some participants, protection of the confidentiality of responses in the key 
informant interviews was extremely important. I contacted potential key informants initially 
via email, a method which was as confidential as possible, although some key informants 
opted to include their administrative assistant in scheduling the interview. Informed consent 
was obtained from all interview subjects by reading a consent statement over the telephone at 
the start of the interview (Appendix D). The detailed written notes of the interview that were 
taken did not include the interviewee’s name or other identifying information.  
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All interviewees also gave permission to digitally record the interview. Those 
recordings were transcribed by a professional transcription services firm approved by the 
UNC IRB that offered a secured system for uploading the recordings and a promise of 
confidentiality. After the recordings were transcribed, they were deleted from the recording 
device, and identifying or potentially identifying information was redacted from the printed 
transcripts. To the extent possible, the interview recordings and electronic transcripts were 
saved using non-person specific identifiers. All of the materials for the study were kept in a 
locked office and on a password protected computer.  
Data Coding, Analysis, and Quality Assurance. Interview data was analyzed using a 
method known as “content analysis.”128 Initially, I planned to use a qualitative software 
analysis program to assist the analysis process. 129 After attempting to use the software, it 
became clear that a handwritten approach would yield the same results, possibly with less 
effort. Key themes and ideas about public health privacy as well as the privacy of public 
health information in the context of ongoing preparedness efforts were identified using a 
node-and-tree type of approach. For example, interviews where the participant favored their 
state law were categorized separately from those where the participant strongly favored 
changes and interviews where the participant valued the power of public health to disclose 
information over the need to preserve privacy were coded differently. It is notable that the 
interviews conducted for this study were conducted with individuals with highly specialized 
education and experience who used acronyms, expressions, and references that might not be 
as familiar to other researchers as they were to me. Time and budget constraints did not 
permit double coding of interview notes. However, some familiarity with the terms used by 
the participants likely made reading and coding the interview data less complex.  
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Timeline 
This study was proposed in the fall of 2008 and was conducted between November 
2008 and July 2009. The identification, collection, and analysis of the policies took place 
between January and March. Key informants were selected and interviewed in January and 
February, and interview data was analyzed in March. Additional policies were collected and 
analyzed as findings from the key informant interviews necessitated. Study findings were 
drafted in March and July and this dissertation was defended in the summer of 2009.  
 
Limitations of this Study 
Any research study is subject to questions about validity, generalizability, and 
reliability.130 Validity is the expression of the degree to which the study measured what it 
was supposed to measure. Because there are no statistical tests that can be used in qualitative 
studies such as this one, triangulation is often used to ensure validity. I attempted to 
triangulate my findings using two sources of data and two methods to understand and 
develop an understanding of state public health privacy law. Generalizability is a measure of 
whether the study findings can be extended to other groups or entities not represented in the 
study. The relatively small number of key informant interviews conducted for this study 
leaves open the possibility that the findings do not reflect the perceptions of all public health 
leaders. On the other hand, an attempt was made to capture a range of opinions. Reliability 
measures whether the study could be repeated. Inter-observer reliability could not be 
measured for this study by double-coding the interview transcripts or state statutes.  
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By design, the scope of this study was also limited. My research was limited 
primarily for explicit provisions in state laws or the annotated cases or regulations. I did not 
research the extension of case law or the common law to my area of inquiry. This may mean 
that I missed applicable cases or regulations that did not appear in the annotations of the 
statutes I reviewed. It may also mean that there are applicable cases, causes of action, or 
regulations that were missed because they did not contain the terms that I used to search for 
code sections. Furthermore, although a commercial database was used to collect the state 
laws, because the coding of the state law analysis was conducted by only one person, it is 
possible that applicable statutes or annotations were overlooked.  The generalizability and 
validity of this study are discussed more specifically in the chapter containing the findings.   
This study was limited to laws related to the sharing of human health information 
arising from public health surveillance or investigations were studied. There are a range of 
other legal and policy considerations in biosurveillance not covered by this analysis that 
include laws related to animal and environmental health surveillance, takings by the 
government without just compensation,83 the search and seizure of property,131 and 
ownership of intellectual property and data. Privacy laws that relate to the other type of 
privacy—bodily integrity and physical autonomy—were not included in this study. In 
addition, statutory analysis alone, even with the limited analysis of court opinions and 
regulations as proposed in this study, provides only information about the laws as written; it 
does not take into account enforcement or interpretation. Thus, this study examined only at 
one part of the broader public health problem of how, when, with whom, and for what 
purpose public health information should be shared to detect or respond to a public health 
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emergency. And, it is worth noting that, while important, law is only one aspect of to any 
particular public health problem.132 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
This chapter describes the findings from: 1) the point-in-time policy analysis of state 
public health privacy laws; and, 2) key informant interviews with federal officials, national 
organizations, and state health officials and privacy officers.  
 
Comparative State Policy Analysis 
I analyzed the public health informational privacy policies, including laws, regulations, 
and case law, of each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia (n= 51) in effect as of January 
1, 2009 for the 12 provisions described in the Methods Chapter and recorded them in a table 
(Table 1, Table 2, and Appendix E). Because no measurement model exists for rating the 
respective value of the relevant privacy provisions in state laws, I did not try to assign values to 
the content of the laws as one might do where the evidence and policy base is better developed, 
as it is, for example, in tobacco control. Instead, I looked for the presence or absence of laws 
and, where laws were present, I looked at whether themes in the text of the law aligned with the 
Model Acts and recommendations found in the public health law literature.  
The analysis revealed that after personally identifiable health information, generally or 
related to communicable disease status, is reported to or collected by a state health department, 
in approximately half of the states (25 of 51), there is no statutory provision or clearly applicable 
case law that imparts a continuing expectation or presumption of privacy or confidentiality of 
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that information.*, † Such information may be used and disclosed by state health officials in ways 
that, although it may be bounded by ethical expectations or practices, is subject to few legal 
restrictions. In two of these 25 states (Michigan and Rhode Island), I was able to find no 
statutory provisions at all that addressed the ability of public health officials to disclose or 
disseminate public health information.  
However, of the remaining 23 states with no statutes that impart a general expectation of 
the privacy or confidentiality of information maintained by the health department, I found special 
treatment in the law for certain types of disease information related to HIV, STDS or other 
specific health conditions. Of these 23 states providing such special treatment, called 
exceptionalism, 17 had provisions related to the special protection that was required to be 
provided to HIV-related information, 11 had restrictions on the disclosure of sexually transmitted 
disease or infection (STD) information (still called venereal disease in some state statutes) and 2 
had provisions related to other disease-specific information, such as tuberculosis.   
Exceptionalism is controversial in public health law; advocacy organizations often find it 
easier to pursue bills that address their specific objectives while state officials and attorneys 
representing public health departments often argue such topical approaches are not supported by 
science or good policy. I found many ready examples of exceptionalism in my analysis. In 
Kentucky, the law prohibits the disclosure of an HIV test result by any person without the 
patient’s consent except unless necessary to treatment.133 In Connecticut, a law related to 
tuberculosis states that—  
                                                            
* For the purposes of this analysis, I have assumed that information reported is not the result of 
treatment by a health department and that health departments are not covered entities under 
HIPAA.  
† If a statute referred to communicable diseases generally, I counted this as a broad presumption 
of confidentiality but if the statute referred only to HIV, STDs, or another specific disease or 
form of disease, I captured those provisions as narrower exceptions. 
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The Commission of Public Health and the director of health for each town, city or 
borough shall keep a record of all such [tuberculosis] reports received by them, 
but such records shall not be open to inspection by any other person other than 
the health authorities of the state and of such town, city, or borough, and the 
identity of the person to whom any such report relates shall not be divulged by 
such health authorities except as may be necessary to carry into effect this 
section, section 19a-263, and section 19a-264.134 
 
Connecticut also treats HIV and mental health information as somehow different from other 
information reported to the health authorities. In South Dakota, the law requires that “The 
identity of any individual appurtenant to an investigation conducted pursuant to a report of a 
venereal disease shall be maintained in the strictest confidence within the venereal disease 
control system, and any information obtained from that individual may not be disclosed in any 
action in any court or before any tribunal, board, or agency.”135 Similarly, in Tennessee and in 
New Jersey, statutes also explicitly state that disclosure of “venereal disease” case reports is 
limited.136 New Jersey restricts disclosure of information related to a person known or suspected 
to have venereal disease “provided, however, that the person’s physician or a health authority 
may disclose the name, address or identity of such person when and only when the physician or 
health authority shall deem such disclosure necessary in order to protect the health or welfare of 
the person or his family or the public.”137 
Of the 26 states in which there is language that proscribes the circumstances under which 
public health officials may disclose personally identifiable health information, four states 
(Alaska, Arizona, Indiana, Oklahoma, Oregon) have provisions for each of the three exceptions I 
analyzed for this study—exceptions for disclosure when public health officials deem it necessary 
to protect the public’s health or the health of an individual, exceptions for statistical analysis and 
research, and exceptions for disclosure to a contact or for contract tracing purposes. Of the 26 
states, an additional 10 had at least two of the three exceptions and 23 of the 26 had exceptions 
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for protecting the public’s health. For example, in North Dakota, a report to the state health 
department is confidential information. The information “may not be disclosed, shared with any 
agency or institution, or made public, upon subpoena, search warrant, discovery proceedings, or 
otherwise, except that” disclosure may be made for statistical purposes if made in a manner that 
no individual can be identified, to enforce the reportable conditions statute and for treatment, 
control and investigation of HIV infection, or disclosure to medical personnel to the extent 
necessary to protect the health or life of any individual.138 In Washington, disclosures are 
permitted to federal, state, or local public health authorities when needed to protect the public’s 
health.139 Arkansas has a unique statute. It allows state, county, or local health officer to disclose 
communicable disease information if the disclosure is: authorized or required by state or federal 
law; permitted by written authorization of the individual; for contact tracing purposes; for 
necessary for research purposes; or “for the purposes of conducting a search of the national death 
index.”140 However, the statute is silent on whether disclosure is authorized to protect public 
health generally, possibly because this is assumed to be a power of the health department.  
Maryland, Nebraska, and New Hampshire had no apparent provision explicitly allowing 
the disclosure of health information when health officials deem it necessary. Interestingly, even 
though these 26 states have clear language related to how and when information can be disclosed 
by public health officials, some of the states treat certain types of disease information differently, 
usually by subjecting disclosures of that information to more stringent standards. Eleven of the 
states have specific provisions related to HIV, four have language related to special treatment of 
sexually transmitted disease information (also called still referred to as venereal disease by some 
state statutes), and 5 have provisions related to TB, genetic or other types of specific diseases.  
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Table 3. States with general privacy, use and disclosure, and exceptionalism provisions 
  General Provisions Exceptions to Use or Disclosure Exceptionalism 
  
Presumption of non-
disclosure 
De-identified for 
statistical analysis 
Contact tracing/ 
partner notification 
Protect 
public health HIV STDs 
Other 
conditions 
State PRESNONDIS EXRESEARCH EXCONTRACE EXPROPH ISMHIV ISMSTD ISMOTH 
AL  Yes  Yes  Yes 
AK  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
AZ  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
AR  Yes 
CA  Yes  Yes 
CO  Yes  Yes 
CT  Yes 
DE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
DC  Yes  Yes  Yes 
FL  Yes  Yes 
GA  Yes 
HI  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
ID  Yes 
IL  Yes 
IN  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
IA  Yes 
KS  Yes *  Yes 
KY  Yes  Yes 
LA  Yes 
ME  Yes  Yes  Yes 
MD  Yes  Yes 
MA  Yes 
MI 
MN  Yes  Yes  Yes 
MS  Yes 
MO  Yes 
MT  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
NE  Yes  Yes 
NV  Yes  Yes  Yes 
NH  Yes  Yes 
NJ  Yes  Yes  Yes 
NM  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
NY  Yes 
NC  Yes  Yes 
ND  Yes  Yes  Yes 
OH  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
OK  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
OR  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
PA  Yes  Yes  Yes 
RI 
SC  Yes 
SD  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
TN  Yes  Yes 
TX  Yes  Yes  Yes 
UT  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
VT  Yes  Yes 
VA  Yes 
WA  Yes  Yes 
WV  Yes  Yes 
WI  Yes 
WY  Yes 
TOT 25 16 7 23 28 15 7 
* Distinguishes between infectious and non-infectious disease. 
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In addition to the finding that only about half of states had provisions that imparted a 
general expectation of non-disclosure, or privacy, of personal health information maintained by 
public health officials, I found several other notable aspects of state laws. Although I was not 
initially looking for this exception and I did not record which states had such a provision in my 
analysis, I noted that a few states allow disclosures with consent. I also noted that, in some states, 
disclosure of personally identifiable health information from one state agency to another appears 
to be prohibited. For example, in Connecticut, the Medicaid program may only obtain 
information that supports payments for the care of individuals receiving medical assistance.141 In 
other words, the Medicaid program appears to be prohibited from receiving information with the 
health department about particular enrollees. While this may be a necessary privacy protection, 
from a public health perspective, it may present a lost opportunity for collaboration between the 
healthcare delivery and financing system and public health authorities seeking to design or 
deliver interventions for at risk populations. 
One state, Kansas, distinguishes between the disclosure of infectious and non-infectious 
diseases in its statutes in a way that other states do not.142 The statute relating to the disclosure of 
noninfectious disease information states:  
Information concerning noninfectious diseases obtained by the secretary under K.S.A. 
65-102 is confidential and shall not be disclosed except as provided in this section. The 
secretary may disclose information concerning noninfectious diseases obtained under 
K.S.A. 65-102: (a) Upon the consent, in writing, of the person who is the subject of the 
information, or if such person is under 18 years of age, by such person's parent or 
guardian; or (b) upon the request of an organization or scholarly investigator for 
legitimate research or data collection purposes so long as such information is disclosed 
in a manner which will not reveal the identity of the persons who are the subject of the 
information. 
Montana was the only state with language that specifically allows for the release of information 
to another state—  
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Table 4. States with selected MSHPA and MESHPA provisions 
  MSHPA  MESHPA 
  
Public 
record 
Permits disclosure to 
federal authorities  
Secondary 
disclosure  
Suspect BT cases disclosed to 
law enforcement 
Other disclosure to law 
enforcement 
State MSHPAPUB MSHPAFED MSHPASECOND MESHPABTLE MESHPALIMLE 
AL        
AK       Yes 
AZ   Yes Yes    
AR Yes      
CA Yes      
CO Yes      
CT Yes      
DE Yes Yes Yes    
DC        
FL Yes      
GA Yes      
HI Yes      
ID Yes      
IL Yes      
IN Yes     Yes 
IA        
KS Yes      
KY Yes      
LA Yes      
ME Yes Yes Yes    
MD Yes      
MA        
MI Yes      
MN Yes  Yes   Yes 
MS Yes      
MO        
MT Yes Yes Yes Yes  
NE Yes Yes     
NV        
NH Yes      
NJ Yes      
NM Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NY Yes      
NC Yes Yes     Yes 
ND Yes      
OH Yes      
OK        
OR Yes  Yes    
PA Yes  Yes    
RI Yes      
SC        
SD        
TN Yes      
TX   Yes Yes    
UT Yes Yes     
VT Yes      
VA Yes      
WA Yes      
WV Yes      
WI Yes      
WY Yes      
TOTAL 39 9 9 2 5 
* Distinguishes between infectious and non-infectious disease. 
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Health care information in the possession of the department, a local board, a 
local health officer, or the entity's authorized representatives may not be released 
except:… to another state or local public health agency, including those in other 
states, whenever necessary to continue health services to the named person or to 
undertake public health efforts to prevent or interrupt the transmission of a 
communicable disease or to alleviate and prevent injury caused by the release of 
biological, chemical, or radiological agents capable of causing imminent 
disability, death, or infection.143 
 
I also found that of the almost half of states (23 of 51) that had provisions expressly allowing 
disclosure of public health information when, in the opinion of public health officials, it was 
necessary to protect the public’s health or the life of an individual.  
Interestingly, however, none of these states’ laws indicates what criteria might be used to 
determine when disclosure is essential to safeguard the public’s health. Although the laws 
themselves are relatively simple, the meaning and scope of the laws is not clear. In the course of 
my analysis, I found no judicial opinions that might help to interpret the scope of the laws. The 
variety of approaches across states opens a question about whether the privacy and security of 
information in the possession of public health authorities varies greatly across states or state 
policies are not aligned with best public health practices. There is likely some commonality in 
the criteria used by public health practitioners in determining when the disclosure of data is 
essential to public health but it is not clear, at least from the policies, what criteria are used. 
In total, I found that 28 states had provisions that provided special protections for HIV 
information, 15 had provisions for STD information, and 7 had provisions for other diseases. 
These exceptions for certain diseases or conditions do not mirror the recommended approach 
found in the Model Acts or in the legal or public health literature. Moreover these types of 
statutes may be contributing to confusion and disagreement among public health officials about 
how and when public health information should be or is disclosed. I also found that in total only 
about one-third of states had explicit provisions that allowed for the use of personally identifiable 
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or potentially identifiable health information collected by the health department so long as the 
data were not identifiable or potentially identifiable when released to the public (16 of 51). Less 
than a quarter of all states had language that addressed: disclosure to contacts of a person with a 
communicable disease, in some cases including pre-hospital personnel exposed to the bodily 
fluids or respiratory droplets of a person with particular infectious diseases (7 of 51); disclosure 
of public health information by the state to federal public health officials (most specifically 
mention CDC or the Department of Health and Human Services) (9 of 51); secondary disclosure 
of personally identifiable information provided by the health department to a third party (9 of 
51); and, when certain types of health threats may or must be disclosed to law enforcement (6 of 
51).  
And, I was able to identify provisions in 39 states that reflect public records act language, 
sometimes referred to as sunshine or freedom of information acts. In most states where I was 
able to identify provisions, the statute appeared to require that all public records be made 
available or accessible to the public and then the statutes set out a series of exceptions, usually 
including health or medical information maintained by the state or in some cases, information 
that disclosure of which would constitute an “invasion of privacy.” But, the meaning and 
application of the provisions could have been clearer. In many states, confusing or inconsistent 
terminology likely necessitates a case-by-case analysis or reliance on the application of case law 
from other domains.   
Overall I found that most states have remarkably few statutes, regulations, or judicial 
opinions of any kind that proscribe the manner in which public health agencies should maintain 
the privacy of disease information or when public health authorities should or may share 
information with other government agencies or the public. But why do so few states have 
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provisions that lack detail about what public health authorities can and cannot do with the 
personally identifiable information they collect and maintain? It is not possible to provide an 
answer with certainty based on this analysis. One possibility is that the common law privacy 
right under which a health care provider is expected to maintain the security and confidentiality 
of a person’s health information, known as the “patient-physician privilege,” is often 
misunderstood to apply to public health authorities as well. Common law is law that arises from 
the decisions of judges; most common law in the United States has its origins in the legal system 
of England adopted when the United States was founded. States have adopted this common law 
patient-physician privilege with some statutorily imposed exceptions, including the exception for 
disease reporting. I did find that states had extensive statutes that addressed the disclosure of 
information by health care providers.  
Given the general expectation of privacy for information possessed by a health care 
provider, it is possible that there is a general misconception that these protections extend to 
information passed on to or collected by public health authorities. However, the common law 
imparts no expectation that the government or public health authorities will maintain the security 
and confidentiality of information obtained for public health purposes. And, this analysis 
suggests that statutes also offer little protection or guidance for how information should be used. 
In most states, although medical records are not generally required to be provided to requestors 
under state freedom of information act or sunshine laws, public health authorities do seem to 
have the power to disclose virtually any record they deem necessary.  
 Until the mid 20th Century, when understanding of the disease and treatment options 
were limited, state and local public health authorities routinely disclosed the name and addresses 
of individuals with infectious diseases in newspapers to warn or protect others from exposure.144 
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This may suggest that public health authorities themselves have lobbied in states against any 
restrictions that would prevent their use of the information they collect, a theory corroborated by 
the suggestion of key informants’ expressions of pride that at the federal level public health had 
successfully put a “hole you could drive a truck through” in the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act.  (See next section: Key Informant Interviews). This might also explain the 
unusual treatment in the law of certain types of disease information, such as HIV diagnoses, 
discussed earlier. If public health officials are or were reluctant to have any legal parameters that 
either mandated disclosure or privacy protections for public health information, the exceptional 
treatment of certain diseases may be an expression of compromise on the part of health officials.  
Also, I found it notable in my analysis that I found nothing in state laws that spoke to the 
impact of a public health emergency or potential emergency on informational privacy rights. 
While there was nothing that indicated procedures or approaches to privacy would change in the 
event of a public health emergency, there was also nothing that indicated that the approach to 
informational privacy would change. This may not be a meaningful finding. Generally, speaking, 
however, it seems possible that if there were a major or prolonged public health event affecting 
large numbers of people, such as pandemic influenza, there might be a need for disclosure of 
names or other personally identifiable information for the purposes of quarantine, isolation, or 
distribution of vaccines or anti-viral medications. It is also possible that it might be impractical 
for public health authorities to maintain compliance with laws that require them to keep records 
of individual disclosures or perform a case-by-case analysis of whether there is sufficient public 
health need for the disclosure of a particular case report.  
It is not clear whether the absence of the recommended provisions examined for this 
study indicates something about the practical value of the model laws used to inform this 
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analysis. It may be that the model provisions, while logical, were simply not relevant in states 
where opportunities for policy change have occurred since they were written. After all, as Oliver 
Wendell Holmes once famously said, "The life of the law has not been logic; it has been 
experience…The law embodies the story of a nation's development through many centuries, and 
it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of 
mathematics." One interviewee reported being the case in his state, the provision in the Model 
Acts were not deemed as necessary by state public health officials. A second interviewee 
reported that he was simply not successful in building the will to have the recommended policy 
provisions implemented in his state. Although not reported by interviewees, it is also possible 
that public health officials are not educated about the need for policies written in the Models and 
did not pursue their implementation.  
 
Key Informant Interviews  
The results from the key informant interviews include verbatim remarks as well as 
interpretation and classification of remarks. There is no index of the interviewees to further 
protect their anonymity (i.e., use of a cross-listing of remarks by certain interviewees). 
State Public Health Key Informants. State health officers, legal counsel to state health 
departments, and state health privacy officers served as the second group of key informants in 
this study. Unlike federal officials who framed their discussions of privacy in terms of trust and 
information sharing, state officials indicated that the protection of privacy was a critical day-to-
day issue in their work. In the interviews, state officials made comments that can be loosely 
grouped into five major thematic areas: 1) characterizations and descriptions of state privacy and 
disclosure laws; 2) the practical implications of privacy law in state and local public health 
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practice; 3) the factors influenced the development of privacy laws in their states, including the 
interest groups that influenced the development and implementation of those laws; 4) the 
relationship between the state and federal government around privacy and the exchange of public 
health-related information; and 5) ideas and opportunities for policy development in public 
health privacy and information sharing to facilitate state public health practice. Although there 
was a great deal of consistency in the ideas expressed by state officials, within each of these 
areas, the interviewees expressed multiple and sometimes conflicting themes and opinions. 
These findings are described in detail below.  
 
If you have seen one state privacy law, you have seen one state privacy law 
When asked to describe or characterize their state privacy laws, the state officials 
responded with laughter, a sigh, or some indication of the extraordinary difficulty of describing 
their state’s approach to protecting the privacy of health information, especially public health 
information. State officials expressed the variety of approaches that have been taken by their 
states over the years that have resulted in numerous and complex statutes and regulations. State 
officials reported that in some cases, relevant state law can be found in mainly in statutes but can 
also be found in case law and regulations. They discussed it as being a difficult and “complex” 
area of law with “important implications” for their work.  
Despite the difficulty in describing their state laws, officials’ comments generally could 
be grouped into one of two dominant models or patterns that their laws followed. In the first 
model, they described a disease-by-disease set of provisions in which privacy requirements are 
linked to the disease and the statutes specific to that disease. In the second model, states 
described some sort of organizing or overarching privacy law with a series of exceptions. In the 
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first model, where the law is found in statutes, interviewees indicated it is rarely found in a single 
statute or even in the same chapter of a state’s code. One interviewee described it by saying: 
Well, it’s really all over the place, which one of the many challenges. We have 
our own sort of mini state HIPAA provision, which for public health doesn’t 
come into play that often unless we want to use it as a basis for refusing to 
release information. The disease reporting statutes have their own 
confidentiality provisions. The HIV/AIDS laws have their own confidentiality 
provisions. Immunization records have their own, and they are all slightly 
different.” 
 
In describing states that followed the second model and seemed to have more intentional 
approach to the privacy of public health information, one interviewee reported “We start out with 
the very general principle that confidentiality with respect to medical records and other items are 
protected under law. And then that’s carved out with several exceptions to that when you can 
disclose medical information.” Another interviewee described a similar approach in which the 
authority was given to health department to create exceptions to a strict protection of 
confidentiality or privacy via rulemaking. Still another said: “Although we didn’t have a specific 
statutory basis for it, there is a catchall provision to protect confidentiality if there is no specific 
statute, and that’s in case law we have in [this state].”  
 
The decision to disclose or not disclose is an important one for state public health officials 
 Interestingly, interviewees seemed to use the words confidentiality, privacy, and 
protection of health information interchangeably to mean the following: holding secure 
personally identifiable information or data from being viewed by too great a number of people; 
ensuring that the information or data is known only to those people who will use it to carry out a 
public health purpose; and ensuring that the information is used as judiciously as possible to 
avoid unnecessary disclosure and stigmatization of the individual. State officials talked about 
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why protecting privacy is so important in ways that were similar to federal officials, focusing on 
trust and relationships. “In my experience, state health agencies are acutely aware of the need to 
preserve and protect health information, not just because of the statutory authority, but because 
we need people to trust us in order for us to do our work.” 
However, state officials also expressed a willingness to use or disclose information if 
necessary, something that was not discussed by the federal officials interviewed.  
If it is a disease of condition that leads to an imminent danger to the 
public, and it’s necessary to prevent a serious or imminent threat to the 
health and safety of the public, then we do and would release that 
information…And we don’t believe that’s inconsistent with our state laws 
because in certain cases being able to share that information...we would 
not only do it, but we consider it our obligation or duty to do so. 
 
They also discussed the need to share information within the public health community. “To the 
extent that we cannot or do not fully share important information with each other, we’re not 
doing our jobs. So, to the extent that laws get in the way of that, we have to fix them.”  
In discussing the release of information, state officials indicated that there are limitations 
on how much information can be released and how it can be released. They were very aware of 
the potential for misuse of data and information. “We are very aware of the potential for some 
misuse there, and so we go to great lengths to ensure that whoever does have access has it in a 
very appropriate way.” Almost all the state health officials indicated that, in their state, 
disclosure of information requires a case-by-case analysis. “You have to think through what 
you’ve got. It’s sort of a HIPAA analysis in some respects.” “People often look for the black and 
white answers to confidentiality questions, and it’s surprising how often there are not black and 
white answers in the law.”  
This creates the need for health officials to do a case-by-case analysis each time that 
public health information may need to be disclosed. Talking about how each situation requires its 
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own analysis in determining if disclosure is appropriate, one interviewee described a situation in 
which the state had to make a difficult decision. “This woman had food [establishment], and she 
had a sick kid there at the food [establishment], and the food got contaminated and a bunch of 
people got sick. And, somebody wanted [the state health department] to disclose the name of the 
[food establishment]. We felt like we couldn’t do that without disclosing, actually, the person 
who was sick.”  
To address these privacy challenges and still achieve the public health purpose, the key 
interviewees talked about creative strategies and approaches. One state official told a story about 
the early stages of recognizing an emerging infectious disease in their state. “We had the first 
death of West Nile. The press wanted the details, a human interest story.” Health officials in the 
state wanted to warn the public in the affected region of the real dangers of West Nile virus and 
the need to take preventive measures like covering up, wearing mosquito repellent, and 
eliminating man-made areas of standing water. However, after doing an analysis of what could 
be released about the fact that a death had occurred, the state health officer and state public 
health attorney decided that they could not release any of the details, such as the county, age, or 
sex of the person who had died because in the rural area where the death occurred, it would be 
relatively easy to determine the identity of the affected person from the obituaries and other 
public records. Still, wanting to both respect the privacy of the grieving family and educate the 
public, the public health official asked the family if they would agree to talk to the press. The 
family agreed. The state health department and the family held a joint press conference that 
provided an opportunity to honor the person who had died and educated the press and the public 
about the measures to take to avoid exposure to the West Nile virus.  
64 
 
Still, in more complex situations, such as large outbreaks of disease or highly political 
situations, state health officials reported that sometimes there was no good solution. They 
suggested that in certain occasions, trying to avoid the request for disclosure in the first place 
was the best solution. They said the best way to do this is by not collecting any information that 
is not absolutely necessary in the first place. One state official said, “That’s probably an 
important take home—you can set up your systems so that you can make it easier to deal with 
the privacy rules by separate what’s obviously private from what isn’t, or what ultimately is 
going to be requested and can be released without disclosing confidential information.”  
 
State public health privacy policy have developed “organically, not logically”  
According to the state officials interviewed for this study, not all state laws that impact 
the ability of state health officials to disclose or maintain the privacy of health-related 
information are ideal or easy to work within. As such, it seemed important to explore what state 
officials thought about why and how state public health privacy laws came to look the way they 
do. The state officials who participated in this study cited one or more of four reasons why their 
laws look the way they do today: 1) need; 2) state-specific events; 3) federal policy 
developments; and 4) events in the fall of 2001.  
Need was by far the most common reason cited by participants. One state official 
described “need” as gradual change over time where their professional judgment suggested 
something needed to be changed and the opportunities to make those changes present 
themselves. The state official said, “There are several little adjustments that happen every year to 
our confidentiality and privacy laws that I think are good. I think we are beginning to refine it 
now and just not saying that we need to balance between the confidentiality, but then we also 
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have to have this access for public health safety available as well.” Another state official said, 
“Well, we keep coming up with these sorts of problems with our…ability to protect the 
information, or our ability to get information, or to release information. And so over the last year 
and half of talking to the same folks we—I don’t know if I suggested it or they suggested it, but I 
think we really need to clean this up.”  
State officials also cited the role of specific events where privacy was violated in a very 
public way as leading to major changes in their state’s laws. One state official who served as a 
state official described a situation in which state officials requested access to a series of records. 
That request lead to a series of political events which in turn resulted in the passage of a bill that 
now requires state officials to take very extensive steps in their daily work to protect privacy. 
Another state official talked about how having a state health director that was interested in public 
health law resulted in a total re-write of their laws. Still others described how the emergence of 
certain diseases or conditions in their states led to the passage of new laws.  
Most state officials also talked about how their laws have been strongly influenced by 
federal policy developments. Citing an example of when they made significant changes to their 
state’s laws, one interviewee said, “Probably back in 2001, 2002 we were already dealing with 
privacy issues. And as HIPAA kicked in, we really entered into it in a very aggressive way.” The 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA) was also cited by other 
interviewees as a major precursor to changes in state laws. Other examples cited included federal 
preparedness policy. One interviewee talked about federal requirements to do preparedness 
planning and indicated those new federal policies prompted them to review the state’s ability to 
withhold certain types of sensitive information that might be a security risk if disclosed during an 
event.  
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Several interviewees described making major changes to their laws after September 11, 
2001. One interviewee described being asked by the Governor right after the anthrax attacks to 
come down and have a conversation about needs of the health department if some other major 
public health event occurred. That conversation led to significant changes in the state’s laws. The 
interviewee talked about how the situation presented an opportunity that was extremely 
important to shaping his state’s law. The interviewee said he told his colleagues, “It’s time to 
give me every gripe, every concern, every issue that you have ever had with our laws…The last 
time [we had this chance] was 100, just slightly under 100 years ago, so now’s the moment” to 
make the confidentiality laws consistent with practice as well as accomplish other policy goals. 
Describing the series of events, the interviewee said, “It was done under a very quick time 
crunch. Initially what it is—it was in reaction to the 9/11 attacks, and the anthrax attacks 
particularly because that really affected—like every else, that was really affected—and the scare, 
and all that sort of thing. It affected the department.” A second interviewee talked about a similar 
situation. He described how right after September 11, 2001 his state made changes to the law that 
increased access to identifying information and increasing the ability to make people give up 
information that might be needed by the health department and other state agencies.  
The result of all these forces, state officials reported, was and is a “hodgepodge” of laws. 
A law gets written “but they didn’t bother to check the other laws that were already on the books 
to make sure that they harmonized.” “We have piecemeal changed things…some things get 
updated and other things just fall by the wayside because there isn’t really a constituency to push 
it, basically. It’s a lot of work to get a bill through the legislature.” One state official described 
their laws as growing “organically, not always logically. It’s a little bit like evolution. It goes 
along and goes along and then all of a sudden it has a mutation somewhere and that, for whatever 
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reason, either works or doesn’t. If it works, it gets perpetuated.” The state officials were 
pragmatic about policy development and their contributions to the law. One said, “It sort of 
depends on whether or not it’s anybody’s priority…It’s all a crapshoot.” 
Several state officials talked about the release of model laws, such as the Model State 
Emergency Health Powers Act, and the influence, or lack of influence, of those models on their 
decisions. “CDC and the model acts weren’t the cause [of changes in my state’s laws] but were 
helpful resources.” One state official described using those models by saying, “Now what we 
didn’t want to do was sort of take it [model act] lock, stock, and barrel. We really wanted—we 
didn’t want to amputate the leg if all we needed to do was cut off the toe. So we really tried to 
take a more surgical approach to incorporating the recommendations of the model act into [the 
state code].” 
Interest groups were described by the key state officials as important to the way in which 
privacy policies developed. Interestingly, state health officials seemed to be consistently, 
although perhaps unknowingly, describing themselves as a key interest group shaping in privacy 
laws.  
“We’re in the process of trying to revamp the confidentially provisions 
regarding reportable diseases…it only protects the person-the identity of the 
person with a reportable disease—and there are lots of times during a disease 
investigation outbreak where you talk to and get health information about 
people that may have been exposed, or controlled—things like that. We want 
to make sure that we can protect that information. We’ve also had problems 
with people assisting during an investigation and getting us the information 
that we need…We’re trying to make it so that we could release information 
about someone with a reportable disease to someone that had been exposed 
to a reportable disease under certain circumstances.”  
 
They also described a number of other interest groups that have influenced their privacy laws. 
On the side of favoring disclosure, they indicated that the plaintiff’s bar, the news media, and 
certain community groups have played a role in shaping policies. Explaining the interests of the 
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plaintiff’s bar, state officials said, “Public disclosure is discovery on the cheap—as well as, 
simultaneously- we have the issues going on simultaneously—we also have people using public 
disclosure for initial discovery.” For that reason, one state official indicated, plaintiff’s attorneys 
in one state are opposing a bill to restrict access to certain types of information on death 
certificates.  
State officials reported that the news media, including radio and newspapers, lobby for 
policies that encourage the disclosure of information. In describing one encounter in a policy 
development process, one state official said “The media interest in a cause of death is very- I was 
surprised at the amount of pressure.” Another state official said, the news media seems to have a 
particular interest in any policy related to the privacy of public health information 
“…particularly if you try to overreach outside of solid group areas like communicable disease. 
Yeah, they get a lot more interested- death certificates and birth certificates kind of thing. When 
you extend it beyond- or try to expand it [privacy protections] beyond traditional medical 
information, yea, there’s a lot of interest from the media- and push back.” The interests of the 
plaintiff’s bar and the news media were described as being economically motivated. Disclosure 
may reduce the cost and barriers to the work of their professions.  
Interestingly, state officials also described a third type of pro-disclosure interest group. 
This group is difficult to label but state officials noted this group has a real influence over state 
legislators. One state official, expressing some frustration, described them this way:  
We have some folks that call and want to know if there has been a person who has 
developed Methicillin Resistant Staph infection in their community, or someone 
that has died of Vancomycin Resistant Enterococcus disease. They feel that they 
need to know who those people are so that they can isolate them. And the 
individuals will call and say we have every right to know because we don’t want 
these people in our community or we don’t want to associate with them. You 
should put a card around their neck and say that they are MRSA so that we can 
avoid them.  
69 
 
 
 
Agreeing, another state official simply said, “There are groups that really push hard for specific 
disease related information. Most of the time for reasons that are not consistent with good public 
health practice.”  
Overall, state officials seemed to indicate that the interest groups that favored limiting 
disclosure, such as civil liberties advocates and HIV/AIDS advocates, were not as significant a 
factor in the development of the laws as the groups that were in favor of disclosure. When state 
officials commented specifically on the influence of the American Civil Liberties Union, there 
was a divergence of opinion. One state official said “The ACLU will get involved from time to 
time but not a whole lot. We don’t have a big privacy interest out there right now.” Another 
interviewee said “[The ACLU is] actually less focused, I think, on health records than on other 
things, like police activities around political activists.” A third interviewee said “[The ACLU] 
were involved in our work around updating our isolation and quarantine laws, and they pay 
attention to this stuff.”  
Similarly, there was some variation in opinions about the role of HIV/AIDS advocates as 
a pro-privacy interest group. One interviewee said, “The climate has changed dramatically. They 
[the HIV advocates] are a lot more supportive of the issue [of disclosure]—we don’t have 
knockdown drag-outs like we did in the past.” Another said, “HIV/AIDS primarily folks are 
certainly, for good reason, would not want to do anything that would open things up [for 
disclosure].” Still a third said, “The HIV/AIDS community is always very concerned about what 
kind of information is out there. We’re trying very hard to mainstream—for collection and 
operational purposes—HIV/AIDS…”  
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On the variety of other disease-specific advocacy groups, one interviewee said 
“Depending on which [disease] you’re talking about, it’s just par for the course that you find 
persons who are knowledgeable in the community, and you have your discussions before you 
take it to the general assembly, not afterwards, at least as much as you can.” Key informants also 
cited the defense bar and medical associations as having an interest in protecting privacy. “The 
defense bar goes out of its way to try and ensure that whatever information we have is 
‘confidential’.” 
 
State-Federal public health information exchange: A voluntary relationship 
State key informants were asked to talk about their perspectives on privacy and 
disclosure of public health information to the federal government. They were quick to point out 
that all sharing of public health information between the states and the federal government is 
voluntary; there is no federal law requiring the reporting of disease information to CDC or any 
other federal agency. However, they also emphasized that they do willingly and openly 
cooperate with CDC by providing as much information as is “appropriate and necessary.” They 
said, “we need [CDC] to have the data; [CDC] need[s] it to know if there are multistate 
outbreaks.”  
They indicated they had not had problems with CDC with reporting specific instances of 
unknown illnesses or in reporting Nationally Notifiable Diseases. “I’ve not seen CDC step over 
the bounds. In fact, it seems like they’re incredibly conservative in confidentiality issues, 
whether it be XDR TB, or whatever. I mean I think they have tried to handle those and are very 
cognizant of confidentiality issues.” Another interviewee, talking about why their state gives data 
so willingly to CDC said, “We look at them [CDC] in kind of the same we’re being looked at in 
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the state. Public health has an obligation to all the people in the nation. And, sometimes, 
confidential information is important to either quell or respond to an epidemic or a problem.”  
Notably, however, key informants had slightly different attitudes toward sharing data 
with CDC via syndromic surveillance systems. They cited concerns about the usefulness of 
syndromic surveillance data in the hands of people without a public health background.  
We were very, very reluctant because of the ambiguity, to play in the 
sandbox…because our concern was that some of this might end up in 
Homeland Security, and in places where public health data would be 
fundamentally misconstrued because they just didn’t have the appropriate 
background to look at it and understand what they were looking at. For them, 
what looks like a monumental problem, we said, oh no, no, that’s not unusual. 
I’m sorry, it’s July, and yes, we have a huge spike of gastrointestinal 
complaints; it’s Grandma’s chicken salad. People leave food out in the sun. 
 
Key informants also raised concerns about the control and ownership of data in national 
syndromic surveillance systems. “In writing the legislation for our state’s syndromic surveillance 
system, we had to be even more restrictive on protecting privacy than we normally would have 
been in order to sell it to our partners—and for good reason.” The interviewee described how 
that “good reason” was that the massive volumes of data available in a syndromic system posed 
not only a threat to individual patient privacy but also to the proprietary interests of hospitals and 
other healthcare providers. For example, data about how many of what kinds of procedures are 
done and the rate of bed occupancy are extremely valuable in a competitive health care market. 
Then, the interviewee went on to describe how when they finally agreed on the need to share that 
state’s syndromic surveillance system data with the CDC, they had to change the state law that 
covered their sydromic surveillance system. “One of the difficult issues of negotiating that was 
how—what were they going to do in sharing it with others at the federal level.” The interviewee 
described the challenges in brokering an agreement on data use and disclosure that met both the 
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needs of the health care facilities as the data providers, the needs of the state, and the needs 
CDC.  
The key informants that participated in this study cited one critical issue in their 
information exchange relationship with the federal government—the presumption that 
information being shared is being shared for “public health purposes” only, meaning for a public 
health investigation, research, or to build an evidence base for public health action. For example, 
one interviewee said, “If your federal partner has a secondary objective that takes it outside the 
public health realm, re-disclosure [by CDC to another agency] could be an issue.” And, “If CDC 
or HHS was going to share data with Homeland Security that would concern me.” Another 
interviewee said, “We’ll share at the state level within the confines of our laws.”  
Although interviewees expressed their willingness to share data within the public health 
system and for public health purposes and their appreciation for federal technical assistance and 
funding, they did take the opportunity to talk about what one interviewee called “role confusion 
issues” at the federal level. “We are a federal, state and local system. We’re going through a 
period now where there’s some debate, and some confusion, about whose role it is to intervene in 
a public health event. Typically, that’s the state’s job.” They talked about how some of this 
confusion seemed to be related to syndromic surveillance, citing examples where certain federal 
government programs gave the appearance that they wanted to intervene in state public health 
issues when federal syndromic surveillance systems suggested a public health event might be 
occurring. Another interviewee said,  
The federal government was all over the place as far as where they wanted to 
go with preparedness. I mean Homeland Security and the Department of 
Health and Human Services; we’re not sure who is in charge of pandemic flu. 
If you listen to one they would say we are, and if you listen to the other, they’d 
say the other one is. And I don’t know what was happening in the previous 
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administration, but somebody should have sat down and said this person is in 
charge or that person was in charge. 
 
Interviewees indicated that this confusion made them “wary” of some federal agencies 
intervening in state public health issues.  
 
Opportunities for creative state public health policies to balance privacy and disclosure  
State officials suggested that although their policies generally work for them in protecting 
privacy and disclosing information when there is a need to do so, there is still work to be done 
and unanswered questions to address. To the extent planning around those issues could help 
them to improve their effectiveness in protecting the public’s health; they seemed to have an 
interest in pursuing new approaches. For example, one state official said “I have no doubt that 
our statutes are not perfect I know they’re nowhere near. There are probably a lot of things we 
can do and should do to try to improve.” Another said, “I’ve learned to say that we’ve yet to 
write the perfect statute on any of this.” 
State officials talked a great deal about how developments in information technology 
developments may be changing what is needed in state public health privacy laws. One state 
official said:  
I am looking down the skyline here at [a major University]; there are brilliant 
people who will be able to do data mining, at least in theory, beyond anything 
we’ve conceived of. The more those records become electronic, that will 
become an issue. It’s one thing when the doctor sends in a particular lab 
report, faxes it in, but everything was online and this was instantaneous, I 
don’t think we’ve heard the last of privacy, nor should we, I guess. 
 
Another said, “As we move into this electronic transmission system, there seems to be greater 
concern about the privacy protections. Will they survive as you move through state and federal 
agencies?”  
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Several state officials talked specifically about the role of privacy law in Health 
Information Exchanges (HIEs), virtual networks of health care providers that exchange 
electronic health records across jurisdictional lines. They asked questions such as “What rules 
apply to them? What laws apply to them? What remedies apply? If there’s inadvertent 
disclosures?” One state official said, “If there are laws that apply to health information 
exchanges, I haven’t seen them. So, we try and put it in a contract? We’re going to sue Iowa’s 
clearinghouse? I don’t think so. So all of that I think is going to develop over time.” Another 
state official said, “The relationship between public health records and the need to keep them 
private…If you’re going to enhance surveillance and disease prevention, you need to do 
everything you can to keep those records private. That would be one area where I’d see 
development. The whole electronic record area is going to have to be scrutinized.” They also 
discussed the need to address the challenges in understanding how emergency statutes and 
privacy laws interplay. One suggested that “something to look at would be basically are the 
existing non-emergency public health confidentiality statutes, would they continue to apply in a 
public health emergency?” Some state officials suggested that this question has not really been 
tested at the state or the federal level because a true test would require a pandemic or similar type 
of event.  
To address these unanswered questions, the state health officials who served as key state 
officials in this study suggested a need for building better relationships between states on privacy 
and information exchange issues, the development of model laws that encourage states to 
consider these issues, and a privacy framework that provides a foundation across states and the 
federal government on which public health information can be exchanged. To build relationships 
among states, state officials talked about how states are establishing agreements among 
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themselves to meet their needs for sharing information. One state official described how a group 
of states has started developing these relationships on their own:  
We have actually signed MOUs between…states to work together in these 
areas at a regional level…It’s actually organized around preparedness issues. 
And, what it’s meant to do is on a regional level to have regionally what 
nationally we would have as Emergency Management Assistance Compact 
(EMAC) on a declared emergency nationally. But we have the same for 
understandings in place even when it isn’t a national emergency. 
  
State officials talked about how achieving these better relationships between states or 
developing new model laws would require a vision for confidentiality and privacy of public 
health information. “I think that if anything would help us, just to know that yes, this is the way 
it’s going to be. This is what we need to aim at. This is what we need to kind of design our 
programs around.” They disagreed, however, on how a common understanding across states 
should be accomplished. One state official said, “I think we need to have a federal, a fairly well 
established, consistent approach to a federal policy on confidentiality that makes sense.” Another 
said, “I think the federal government can facilitate some sort of framework but I don’t think this 
can be a federal initiative.” One state official suggested expanding the Health Information 
Security and Privacy Collaborative (HISPC), a project of the National Coordinator for Health 
Information Technology, which has been providing grants states to address barriers to health 
information exchange. Others, citing HIPAA, suggested a solution not based in an IT initiative 
would be a better approach.  
State officials talked as much about what should not be done to improve the mutual 
understanding of privacy and security of health information as they did about what should be 
done. They very clearly indicated that federal preemption of state policies or federal legislation 
would be undesirable. Federal law, although powerful, was seen as inflexible. One state official 
said, “How long have we been talking about FERPA? We can’t get that damn law changed. 
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Well, now the difference with HIPAA is we were able to ensure that they put a hole in it that you 
can drive a truck through.” One key state official, lamenting the problems with implementing 
federal legislation to protect the privacy or promote the exchange of public health information 
said:  
My experience in this kind of law is that it’s not static. It’s something I have 
dealt with every week for 28 years. So, it’s not something that you can just do 
it one time, and have it sit on the shelf. If you do that you’re going to create 
more problems than you solve. I know it sounds easy. You do it, check it off the 
list, get a federal law—boom, that’s it, but things are going to change and you 
are going to be stuck with it and a lot of the of the unintended consequences of 
it.  
 
Another official said, “I really worry about new federal law in this area…It’s impossible to 
change.” To illustrate their point that federal legislation might be more harmful than helpful, 
state officials cited the federal laws related to education records and substance abuse and 
provided examples of those laws are used to avoid reporting to state and local health 
departments. “I have an infirmary physician at a collect in [this state] telling that because of the 
federal law if he sees somebody in the infirmary with HIV infection he cannot report that to us.”  
Key state officials also cited federalism as a reason for emphasizing state-based solutions 
to public health privacy issues. “There’s very little, if any, information that’s reported directly to 
the CDC…It’s all filtered through the states, which—in a very real way that’s a constitutional 
issue…Yes, because otherwise you’re going to fundamentally re-write almost 250 years of 
federalism.” Other state officials were in favor of efforts to update model laws. Model laws 
could provide “a checklist approach to say can your state assure that you can do these eight 
things, regardless of how you get them done?” Another state official said, “I am not a big 
advocate for federal solutions to problems like this. I’m a big advocate for model state laws, if 
they’re needed, as a better approach to getting things done.” Yet, they all seemed to agree that 
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bridges could be built to achieve more commonality between states. One state official, 
explaining this, said that “Certainly one of the things that we can do is we can start to come up 
with commonalities; commonalities of how we define things, commonality of how we approach 
things. Now is that altogether possible? No, because states and people are just too different. That 
said, I think we can come closer to one another.”  
 
Federal and National Organization‡ Key Informants. The federal officials and national 
public health professional organization representative who served as key informants in this study 
discussed privacy as only one factor, although an important one, in the broader information 
sharing environment. However, there were themes in their discussions around privacy and public 
health practice. For example, privacy and privacy-related laws and policies are an important but 
daily part of the bureaucratic boundaries in which federal public health professionals work. 
Establishing and building trust, including privacy policies that acknowledge public health 
professionals as stewards of data, is critical to enabling the appropriate sharing of public health 
information. Unlike the state officials interviewed, federal officials argued barriers to 
information sharing include commercial interests, information technology infrastructure, and a 
lack of a common framework for the privacy of public health information. Federal officials also 
indicated these barriers need to be addressed on a national level.  
 
Critical need to share public health information  
                                                            
‡ For the purposes of the analysis, the representative from the national association of public 
health officials was grouped with the federal key informants, for a total of 6 informants. 
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Without exception, federal officials viewed the sharing of information as a critical need 
and tool of public health practitioners. One interviewee said that information sharing is critical to 
emergency preparedness and response because “One of the biggest challenges [in public health] 
is the inability to know at the earliest stages of a common event where it is in fact not a common 
event, whether it’s in fact something that has broader national, or cross jurisdictional 
implications, and to respond most quickly.” Another federal official said the sharing of 
information is important because “Many potential interesting studies and resources are lost to us 
because it’s too difficult to get the data.” Still others talked about the role of information in the 
public’s perception of whether an event was an emergency. A federal official making reference 
to an incident involving a person suspected to have a form of drug resistant tuberculosis and the 
potential exposure of passengers on an international airline flight and questions about what 
information government could disclose said, “With the Andrew Speaker case, for example 
obviously that was—got a lot of media attention. Not all situations are like that, necessarily—get 
to that level or that kind of attention. But, it’s not an unimaginable sort of thing to be—to happen 
again.”  
Interviewees talked about the need to exchange and share public health information in 
order to create a “picture” of public health events domestically and globally so that public health 
agencies would know how and where to focus their “assets,” such as personnel, research and 
investigation capacity, laboratory capacity, stockpiles of pharmaceuticals. In discussing the 
strategy to try to develop such a “picture,” one respondent said “If we can improve the picture at 
the community level that in aggregate, improves the picture at the national level.” Some referred 
to this idea as a “Common Operating Picture (COP).” Others, who expressed some 
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dissatisfaction with how this term was being used in multiple ways at the federal level, dismissed 
it as unhelpful and non-specific.  
In the context of discussing the need for this picture, Interviewees discussed syndromic 
surveillance as one tool for maintaining an awareness of health events but expressed concern 
about the frequent misunderstanding by others, even those in the public health community, of the 
limitations of syndromic surveillance. They discussed the lack of complete geographic coverage 
of BioSense, a Centers for Disease Control (CDC) syndromic surveillance program and system, 
and the limited population covered by Essence, a Department of Defense (DOD) system. Others 
talked about the importance of the highly skilled and highly trained human element in 
interpreting and communicating the data necessary for such a picture. However, some of the 
officials were hopeful that by “fluxing” together a variety of existing data and information 
sources, this picture of the public’s health that they saw as necessary, at least domestically, could 
be established. Doing so would require various forms of public health information to be shared 
across jurisdictions.  
 
The type of information that needs to be shared depends on the type of threat and stage of 
response 
The federal officials who served as key informants in this study talked about how the 
information they need to detect and respond to public health events varies with the type of health 
threat and the type of response. Several of the interviewees discussed the particular information 
needs of public health responders to do their jobs. One respondent offered that “There are two 
types of data needed in a public health response—epi data and response data.” It is often the 
epidemiological data that contains personally identifiable health information or potentially 
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personally identifiable information and other information where privacy is a concern. What is 
needed depends on the situation. A second federal official suggested that “In a bio event… 
[Details about individual cases] are important because it helps you to know the characteristics of 
the disease. However, when it comes to something like a hurricane…I don’t think the number of 
deaths is nearly as relevant as the rate.”  
The interviewees also indicated that the type and amount of information available also 
varies with the phase of the response. “We get a great deal of information on WHO alerts, CDC 
alerts, for things that are coming up. However, once people go into response mode, we often 
don’t get the more detail that we’re being asked to provide.” Sometimes that information is 
critical to the response. “We often can’t get the information that could have an economic 
impact—a poor economic impact on the hospital system, the nursing home association in that 
state, anything where people might choose not to utilize services.” Interviewees said that this 
sometimes requires interpreting a request for sensitive information using professional judgment 
and experience. “We’ve seen a couple of queries that are obviously based on a senior decision 
maker…either knowing the area really well or being concerned about specifics…asking how 
many beds are available at a facility. They really don’t want to know that it’s seven beds. They 
really want to know that the facility is 95% full and that they can handle another 5%, versus the 
specific value…it’s that you have to better understand what their data request is really getting 
at.” Interviewees talked about other examples saying things such as, “We see that all the time. 
How many cases of salmonella? Well, how many cases of salmonella are usually occurring in a 
city or any parts of this country on any given day” and the need to interpret a request for case-
specific information where the data might pose privacy problems or simply be unavailable.  
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Privacy-related laws and policies are a part of “the bureaucracy” but they work, too  
Privacy laws and policies were viewed by the federal officials as simply a part of the 
“bureaucracy” in which they do their jobs and many were quick to point out that other forms of 
sensitive information were also entrenched in a complex bureaucracy. “It’s difficult to find the 
correct balance between protecting individual privacy without hindering the work of public 
health, and I think we’re still as a nation struggling a bit to find that balance. And, we’re also 
stuck with the transition between primarily paper-based records and electronic health records.” 
Those things make it difficult to develop an approach to handling a request for sensitive data in 
an appropriate way. 
Although privacy officers are in place in many organizations to help negotiate the 
balance between protecting and disclosing information, federal officials indicated that interaction 
between programmatic staff and privacy officers and legal counsel are not a regular occurrence. 
Those interactions are usually limited to issues that are controversial. “Where I end up 
interacting with the privacy officer is because I’m trying to establish something on a fairly high 
level through data sharing.” They expressed an appreciation for the expertise of their colleagues 
but some frustration with the privacy laws themselves. On the one hand, they said things such as 
“Some barriers are totally appropriate and necessary” while others reported that privacy laws and 
policies created real barriers to their work. (See discussion of barriers below). The interviewees 
also expressed varying attitudes and understanding of privacy issues. With a fair amount of 
confidence, one said “I don’t know of any specific law that doesn’t allow someone to talk 
between levels of government or cells of government.” Another, somewhat more cautiously said 
privacy laws are complex “which is why you need a lot of experience being able to address 
them.” All of the federal officials expressed a feeling of a disconnect between privacy policy and 
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practice on a day-to-day basis. One pointed out that “We have not yet quite achieved harmony as 
to the application, the appropriate application of those [legal privacy] barriers across all 
jurisdictions.” Several were hopeful that existing policies could serve a basis to begin to address 
some of those issues. Citing Homeland Security Directive 21, one federal official said “I think 
HSPD-21 drew a line that said from this point forward we are going to smartly work through this 
problem…That’s something we haven’t done in the past.”  
 
To address privacy and security and still share information, we need “a network of trust”  
The federal key informants who participated in this study felt that a balance between 
protecting public health information and public health practice needs could only be achieved by 
establishing a “network of trust.” One of the federal officials described the need for trust by 
saying, “The farther you lean forward, and the more you have to have a trust relationship in order 
to do that.” By “lean forward” the federal official seemed to mean take a proactive approach to a 
public health event or emerging situation that threatens health. The other interviewees expressed 
similar feelings that the trust relationship is what facilitates the flow of public health information. 
“The trust relationship that allows you to say that I don’t have any concerns that you have this 
information…or that allows that negotiation process to say that, well, I don’t think you need a 
name identifier in order to do that role.” Some of the interviewees interviewed for this study said 
that trust in the sharing of public health information both during an emergency and as a matter of 
routine requires a common understanding of privacy among public health practitioners. They 
also said that there is work to be done to create a common understanding. For example, one 
respondent said “Like the definition of privacy. What is it again? And it’s this whole concept of 
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how much information do you share? And so when are you actually violating privacy? Privacy 
might mean something different for law enforcement vs. public health vs. medical.”  
One interviewee felt that, “the most senior leaders [in the United States Government] 
need to agree that together we will …build a network of trust.” Interviewees were quick to 
provide examples of how leadership that took the wrong approach to sharing public health 
information could diminish trust. Most of the federal officials suggested that mandating 
information sharing between groups can actually reduce the level of trust, and several 
interviewees cited a Department of Homeland Security program known as the National 
Biosurveillance Information System (NBIS) as an example of such an approach. NBIS is 
intended to coordinate the sharing of biological information across the federal government that is 
being implemented in such a way that federal agencies are being required or requested to share 
information at a level of detail they normally would not provide to other federal agencies. 
Several interviewees instead said a better model to promote or develop a network of trust would 
be something more like an expanded version of the Biological Indications and Warnings 
Analytic Community (BIWAC), a relatively informal group of federal officials from different 
agencies that share information about potential health threats in accordance with their 
professional and agency requirements.  
 
Policies and procedures about roles and responsibilities can help build that trust  
Most of the federal officials who served as key informants said that there is a need for 
policies and procedures relating to when and how information can be shared among public health 
officials and with others. “It’s putting in place the policies and procedures that make people feel 
more comfortable that when you do share something, it’s handled responsibly.” Interviewees 
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differed in the degree to which they felt that policies should be explicit. One federal official 
suggested that the policies should be extremely explicit and require the sharing of only the 
minimum information necessary. Others suggested that policies could play a more facilitative 
role in creating the broader environment in which information is shared appropriately. “While we 
can agree that we need to share information and discuss what kind of information should be 
shared and put some business rules in place, there must be policy and processes designed so that 
organizations and agencies have a level of trust, of sharing the information within the partner 
structure…so that they’re not uncomfortable or feel uneasy that their information would be 
released.” One indicated that the way to achieve that was some sort of “governance” structure for 
data and information. However, another federal official indicated that they did not believe more 
policies would help at all; they thought actions of those involved in information sharing were 
more important than policies.  
 
Public health professionals see themselves as “stewards” of data  
One of the themes that came through very strongly in the interviews was that federal 
public health officials see themselves as “stewards” of data. As stewards, they manage and 
protect data but do not own it. The key informants expressed a strong desire for that role to be 
recognized and respected, or at least understood, by other professions that seek to use public 
health data. Their attitudes about data stewardship were explained in very pragmatic terms, as 
being necessary given the complex legal framework in which they work. They also said things 
such as “The reality is that a lot of times data sharing will always relate to personal relationships, 
whether there’s a policy or not.” One federal official lamented that a lack of understanding of 
their role as stewards and lack of opportunity to build relationships with professionals in other 
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sectors posed challenges. “So, it’s often that when an event happens we’re trying to create those 
relationships on the fly, based on previous connections and things of that sort…People often 
expect that we would have things like bed counts, or hospital status—overflow status, ER being 
overflowed, things like that—but that’s often not the case.”  
They also seemed to feel strongly that the data over which they preside should be used 
primarily for public health and only very cautiously shared for other purposes. For example, one 
federal official said, “You build a relationship at the state level or local level of trust with the 
provider. If that information goes up to CDC and then over to Homeland Security, then, you 
know, you get [public health and the healthcare provider] freaking out a bit.” They cited 
commercial interests in health care settings as diminishing trust and conflicting with their data 
stewardship responsibilities.  
 
Lack of a common language around privacy is a challenge to balancing protecting and sharing 
information  
Overall, federal officials reported several challenges in balancing the protection of 
information from inappropriate use and disclosure and the need to share public health 
information as part of a strategy to intervene in a public health event. There was a sentiment 
among the key federal officials that there is a lack of agreement both within the public health 
community and between public health and other professions about which organizations need 
what types of information and for what purposes. Some federal officials felt strongly that at the 
federal level, there is never a need for personally identifiable information (PHI); there is only a 
need to know the magnitude of the event and what is going to be required to assist in the 
response. They explained that the states “don’t see the need for CDC to have that information 
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because of data stewardship issues and trust between levels of government (or lack thereof).” 
Others indicated that the federal government does receive PHI in some situations. Those federal 
officials felt that it would be impractical and impossible to mount a federal public health 
response to an event without some federal officials being made aware of some PHI. One federal 
official summarized this conflict by saying “So there are challenges in defining…roles and 
responsibilities and what kinds of information should be shared and the conditions under which it 
should be shared.” 
Interviewees also indicated that their own limited knowledge of the law is a significant 
challenge. They talked about how variability in state and federal agency approaches to the 
privacy of public health information is difficult for non-lawyers to understand. They indicated it 
was even more difficult to communicate to the public. However, one interviewee disagreed and 
said “I have not found the variability in [state] laws in an emergency to be an impediment.” That 
interviewee also said that “A lack of understanding that the information can be used in a 
constructive way and that the risks of sharing information are lower than the potential benefits” 
and “if people know that the law has…the flexibility in emergencies to address what needs to be 
addressed” it would help. The suggestion is it was a lack of understanding of the law and not 
variability in the law that was the primary challenge.  
Interviewees also expressed that public health privacy and disclosure law leaves many 
questions unanswered. “When do you share, how much, is there a difference between what 
public health needs and law enforcement needs, how do they safeguard information, how long do 
they keep it, etc. What if something goes wrong?” They also felt law does not address issues that 
influence decisions about information sharing such as liability and redress or practical problems 
like second generation data sharing that are a part of their day-to-day work. One interviewee 
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pointed out that “Private sector entities aren’t going to be willing to share if we don’t address 
liability issues.” Another said “If a state continues to use a women and children food stamp 
program for your mothers who are low SES [Socio-economic Status], and we [the federal 
government] go around and ask three states that are in a hurricane-impact zone, do you still have 
that system in place? It’s their concern that it would show that they’re not doing their job as a 
public health department.” And still another federal official discussing the difficult of holding 
people in federal agencies accountable said, “There needs to be a vehicle for private citizens to 
have redress if their privacy is violated.” 
Questions about sharing data that another program or federal agency provided, sometimes 
referred to as second generation data sharing, come up often in interviewees’ work. In trying to 
convey the seriousness of this issue, one federal official said “When our agency gets information 
how we share beyond our agency is of equal importance to the entity giving it to us as how use it 
ourselves.” One interviewee said, “The salmonella outbreaks are a good example because 
Homeland Security was looking for information and FDA and CDC are running an investigation 
trying to figure out what’s going on.” The interviewee explained that while sharing some of the 
request data or information did not pose a problem, there were concerns about sharing 
information that was proprietary about the source of the outbreak, private patient information, or 
might lead to legal action that would make continuing the epidemiologic investigation difficult. 
Interviewees indicated that law provides them with little guidance—  
The issue of second generation data sharing is a frequent problem, even if it’s 
going to be de-identified, and we, under existing guidance and laws, usually 
can’t share that data even though we would be an essential and efficient 
source of it to other groups… We have to send them back to get the component 
from the data owner and the other component from the different data owner, 
etc.  
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Another tried to make light of how much work trying to understand and comply with the relevant 
law can mean in any particular situation by saying “[Second generation data sharing challenges] 
can always be overcome if the person can live long enough, fill out all the forms, and survive the 
bureaucratic process.” Still a third federal official suggested that most legal guidance is of little 
help when the unexpected happens.  
Federal officials also viewed information technology (IT) as a possible tool for improving 
the sharing of public health information and the protection of privacy with a degree of caution. 
One federal official said, “There are technology solutions that could improve around the edges of 
information sharing, but I generally have experienced that the technology solutions are easy once 
there’s an agreement about what, when, and how to share.” Some of the Federal officials were 
skeptical about how technology could help to improve sharing and the protection of privacy 
when there is basically “…No IT infrastructure in state and local public health.” “There just 
needs to be more IT investment at the state level and they just don’t have the money to do it, 
essentially.” “One of the issues right now is, you know, the federal government doesn’t have to 
balance a budget but the states and local governments do.” They also expressed mixed feelings 
about IT in general and some saw it as a potential threat. “It’s very hard to for health officials to 
invest in IT. Sometimes public health people see themselves as being replaced by the IT thing, 
whatever it is.”  
Some federal officials thought more IT might create a greater challenge to privacy. “You 
can do almost anything with data; no data is totally safe or de-identified.” Others interviewees 
felt that IT would be helpful but were skeptical about getting to that on a nationwide basis, point 
out that “Most of the military installation level sharing of data with state or local health 
89 
 
departments is non-electronic in nature” while “Almost all of the data DOD and VA send and 
receive and exchange with each other is electronic.  
 
Summary of Results 
Privacy is an important issue in public health practice. Key findings from my research include:  
• There is a critical need to share public health information within public health and across 
jurisdictions; 
• State-Federal public health information exchange is a voluntary, but complicated, 
relationship; 
• The type of information that needs to be shared depends on the type of threat and stage of 
response; 
• The decision to disclose or not disclose is an important one for state public health 
officials; 
• Public health professionals see themselves as “stewards,” not owners, of data and 
information; 
• Lack of a common language around privacy is a challenge to balancing protecting and 
sharing information;  
• Privacy-related laws and policies are a part of “the bureaucracy” but they generally serve 
their purpose; 
• If you have seen one state privacy law, you have seen one state privacy law; 
• There are opportunities to create new state public health policies to better balance privacy 
and disclosure;  
• State public health privacy policy have developed “organically, not logically;” 
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• To better address privacy and security and still share information, we need “a network of 
trust;” and, 
• Policies and procedures about roles and responsibilities can help build that trust.   
State public health officials, especially, strongly recognized the need to protect privacy. 
In discussing privacy and disclosure issues in their work, state and federal officials discussed 
three aspects of privacy: 1) the physical protection of an individual person’s or aggregated set of 
potentially or actually identifiable health information; 2) decisions about whether and to what 
extent information acquired by public health officials should be treated as private, protected, or 
confidential; and 3) decisions about to whom and when public health information about 
individuals or groups should be actively shared or disclosed. However, public health officials use 
terms such as privacy, confidentiality, protecting information, sharing, disclosure, release in a 
variety of ways, some incorrect, suggesting that there is a lack of common language within 
public health for issues related to privacy.  
The analysis of state public health laws suggested that despite much work over the past 
decade, including the development of model state statutes and convening a collaborative to 
modernize state public health laws, public health privacy laws exist in few states, are unclear, 
and do not reflect provisions recommended by experts in the field. Interviewees report that 
where there has been change in state laws, it has been driven by notable public health events, 
such as the emergence of HIV/AIDS and the anthrax attacks in the fall of 2001, but the state law 
analysis revealed that the changes have not necessarily been made in a logical way and the 
resultant laws do not always offer public health practitioners the flexibility they need. However, 
some interviewees reported that their current state laws do generally allow for the protection of 
privacy and disclosure as needed, or they have found ways to work within the confines of the 
91 
 
laws. I found that there is a gap between how the public health leaders interviewed for this study 
understand the privacy, protection, and appropriate sharing of public health information and 
current state laws. Through the statutory analysis, I found that while the laws may offer public 
health officials some flexibility, existing state laws are very limited, incomplete, not clear, 
antiquated, and difficult to interpret. The laws may be subject to various interpretations and the 
different approaches to different types of disease information means there is not a single 
adequate approach to the protection of public health information. These findings suggested that 
federal and state officials are accurate in their views that state laws may not be sufficient in the 
future given developing technology, the development of electronic health records, prolonged or 
severe public health emergencies, and in light of a growing population and shrinking budgets for 
public health. 
Through the interviews, I also learned that state officials are concerned with how 
decisions about the disclosure or release of information often must be made at the state level on a 
case-by-case basis, which is inconvenient and expensive. They also raised questions and 
concerns about ownership and use of public health data outside their jurisdictions, regardless of 
the user, but especially Homeland Security and law enforcement and the media. State officials 
cited the need for changes to state laws or other approaches to address privacy issues if federal 
policies promoting the inter-jurisdictional and interdisciplinary sharing of information were fully 
implemented. Given Constitutional law and federalism, state officials expressed strongly 
negative impressions of potential approaches that might involve federal legislation mandating or 
somehow preempting state control in this area. They also had a variety of opinions as to whether 
model laws were useful and whether the language in existing model laws aligned well with their 
understanding of how they protect and disclose data, during an emergency or otherwise.  
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Federal officials, who work primarily with aggregated data from the states and sometimes 
with personally identifiable health information, are more concerned with the flow of information 
and ensuring it reaches the public health professionals who need to make evidence-based 
decisions about public health interventions. Interviews with federal officials and national 
partners suggest that recent federal policy developments promoting the sharing of public health 
information are viewed as needed but that there are considerable challenges to successful 
implementation. At the same time, federal officials were divided in their concerns about 
including the Department of Homeland Security in the flow of public health data or information.  
Both federal and state officials indicated a need to build a network of trust among those 
that do need to share public health information. Both groups also acknowledged that the lack of 
uniformity in laws and practices related to the acquisition, use, and storage of public health 
information breeds disagreement and inhibits trust. Those inconsistencies are also a source of 
confusion for a variety of stakeholders. The interviewees stated that privacy law would be more 
useful to them if it acknowledged issues such as the role of public health as stewards of data, the 
need to share data freely among public health professionals, and the need for flexibility and 
professional judgment in determining when to disclose data to protect the public’s health.  
Based on the interviews with federal and state officials, it seems reasonable to conclude 
that there are opportunities to remove privacy policy barriers to public health practice and to 
create a more consistent policy environment that is driven by the science and professional 
judgment of public health leaders around the appropriate disclosure of public health information 
within public health, with public health partners, and with the public. Both state and federal key 
informants seemed to suggest that changes in both policy and practice around informational 
privacy may be needed to enable the movement toward public health data collection at the source 
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of patient care, a whole patient approach to public health practice, and the use of information 
technology in public health practice. However, the interviewees also indicated that an essential 
precursor to deciding what changes should be made to state public health privacy laws is a 
common understanding of what ideal privacy practices and policies should accomplish. In other 
words, the interviewees thought that before anyone tries to change state laws or develop a model 
law, there was a need to build consensus around when the privacy of information under the 
control of public health officials should be maintained and what criteria would justify disclosure. 
I agree and in the next chapter describe an approach to developing a better shared understanding 
of how to protect the privacy of public health information while allowing for appropriate 
disclosures when needed to protect the public’s health.  
   
 
 
 
 
PLAN FOR CHANGE 
 The purpose of this dissertation research was to better understand state public health 
privacy laws and whether those laws offer public health practitioners the flexibility they need in 
their work. The preceding chapter describes a need to develop a mutual understanding among 
public health professionals about how to protect the privacy of public health information. The 
key informant interviews conducted for this study suggested that public health practice is 
predicated on trust that information provided to public health officials or exchanged among 
various governments will be: 1) used for public health purposes; and, 2) disclosed to the public 
or others only when absolutely necessary to protect health and safety. Results from the policy 
analysis demonstrate that state laws, while adequate, do not completely address practical public 
health issues related to privacy and disclosure of public health information. Together, these 
results suggest that the development or maintenance of that trust may not be adequately 
addressed in existing public health policies.  
To the extent a common understanding of how public health information possessed by 
health officials should be protected does exist, the principles are not well-developed enough to 
communicate to public health partners, such as law enforcement. To address this need, I propose 
the development of a national framework for the protection of public health information. The 
term “framework” is intentionally broad. It is intended to imply a common approach across 
jurisdictions and levels of government to protecting the privacy of public health information 
while still allowing that information to be used to achieve public health purposes.  I propose a 
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framework rather than a model state law for several reasons.  First, a framework lays out the 
principles, rather than suggested statutory language, and I believe that reaching agreement on the 
principles is more valuable than proposing model language. Second, a model statute presumes 
the same need for statutory language across all states while I found that states take different 
approaches; some rely on statutes while others rely on regulations. Finally, establishing a set of 
principles without model statutory language places the emphasis on the substance, rather than the 
phrasing, of state laws.     
 
Components of a National Framework 
The purpose of the framework would be to promote a common understanding of 
desirable principles and practices related to privacy, security and disclosure of information 
possessed or controlled by governmental public health entities. One of the fundamental questions 
that must be answered in the development of the framework is whether disclosure ever an 
acceptable disease control measure or necessary to carry out another control measure. Another 
question that must be answered is around whether it is possible to develop a framework that 
takes an all-hazards type of approach or is separate treatment of certain types of disease 
information necessary. The process of creating this framework may contribute to the 
development of consensus among the various stakeholders on the principles that should be 
applied to the privacy, protection, and disclosure of public health information.  
Through the research conducted for this study, I identified key principles for inclusion in 
the framework including: consent; minimum necessary; disclosure at the level data were 
collected; continued protections in times of emergency; and, discretion of state and local health 
officials. Consent for disclosure of potential or actual personally-identifiable information should 
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be sought from the individual or group of individuals that the information is about whenever 
feasible. Reflecting the “minimum necessary” ideal expressed by participants in the key 
informant portion of this study, the framework might also convey that while data and 
information about risks to public health should be as transparent as necessary, only the minimum 
amount of personally identifiable information necessary from a scientific perspective to convey 
events and risks should be disclosed to public health partners or to the public. In addition, 
another principle to be reflected is that data disclosure is preferable at the level of government at 
which the data were collected; in other words, if a state health department collected the data, the 
state health department, not a federal agency, should make the determination regarding 
disclosure. To ensure continuity of protections in times of emergency or uncertainty, individual 
persons should have available the same informational privacy protections in times of both public 
health emergencies and non-emergencies. And, requests for disclosures of public health 
information, whether personally identifiable or not, should be subject to the professional 
judgment of public health officials. 
The framework should also describe ideal practices for the protection of public health 
information. These practices might include: 1) the avoidance of unnecessary information 
collection; 2) methods for de-identification of data; 3) criteria that trigger the disclosure for 
public health purposes; 4) criteria that trigger or permits disclosure for law enforcement 
purposes; and, 5) criteria for disclosure when a third party’s commercial interests are involved. 
For example, personal identifiers should be collected or maintained by public health only where 
there is absolute public health, health-related research, or vital records necessity. Data and 
information about an individual or group of individuals should be de-identified whenever 
possible to avoid the identification of individuals or stigmatization of groups. Disclosure or 
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sharing of personally-identifiable health information or aggregate community-level data should 
take place to further or achieve a public health or health-related research purpose. The 
framework should provide criteria that can be used by a health official as a guide as to what is a 
public health or health-related research purpose. As the results of this study also suggest, criteria 
for disclosure or sharing of personally-identifiable health information with law enforcement or 
for other HIPAA-permissible disclosure purposes would be helpful. And, it should provide that 
consent is preferable for disclosure where the commercial interests or needs of third parties are 
involved, such as where there legal action and the data might be discoverable during a litigation 
process. 
 
Development of the Framework 
Ultimately, the content of the framework should be developed through a consensus 
process involving a representative group of stakeholders convened or championed by a public 
health professional organization, such as Association of State and Territorial Health Officials 
(ASTHO), CDC, or a high-level coordinating office, such as The Office of the National 
Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC) or an office within the White House.  
There are many stakeholders in questions about the privacy and security of public health 
information. The development of this proposed framework should involve stakeholders from the 
following sectors, fields, or organizations: healthcare delivery; health information technology; 
health insurers; news media; private sector employers; state, local, tribal and territorial public 
health; privacy advocates; law; patient advocacy (e.g. HIV or tuberculosis patient organizations); 
religious organizations; and vulnerable population treatment and advocacy (e.g., National 
Alliance for Hispanic Health). Public health professional organizations such as the American 
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Public Health Association, Association of Public Health Laboratories, Association of State and 
Territorial Health Officers (ASTHO), Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE), 
and National Association of County Commissioners and Health Officers (NACCHO). In 
addition, the following federal agencies would be key stakeholders in the development of the 
framework: HHS’s Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, CDC, Department of 
Homeland Security’s Office of Health Affairs, Department of Defense’s Health Affairs and 
Northern Command, Department of Justice, Food and Drug Administration, and USDA. If 
convened by the federal government to develop recommendations, this group of stakeholders 
would likely be covered by the Federal Advisory Committee Act, which imposes requirements 
on bodies that provide the recommendations to the federal government. The group established 
could make recommendations regarding the content of the Framework to be released in a 
government report or other document.  
There are several emerging and intersecting policy streams or interests at the national 
level that suggest a window of opportunity to convene a group of stakeholders to develop the 
Framework. The first stream is the health reform agenda being carried out by the current 
administration.145 This agenda includes a commitment by the Obama administration to the work 
on health-related information technology and an initiative to create a nationwide infrastructure 
for electronic health records. The second stream is the emergence of Novel H1N1 Influenza, 
which focused the attention of the White House and high level executive branch offices on the 
needs of public health.146 The third stream is changes within Homeland Security policy147 and 
the continuing interest in the Department of Homeland Security in creating a public health 
“information sharing environment” (ISE). ISE a term used in the intelligence sector to describe 
“A trusted partnership… in order to detect, prevent, disrupt, preempt, and mitigate the effects of 
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terrorism against the territory, people, and interests of the United States by the effective and 
efficient sharing of terrorism and homeland security information.”148 The current political focus 
on reforming the United States health system, also, seems likely to result in increased scrutiny on 
collection and use of health-related data by the federal government. Taken together, these 
streams suggest there may now or soon be a critical mass of interest at the national level to 
generate action that might further one or more of these initiatives of the Obama administration.  
Alternatively, the framework could be promoted on a more grassroots level from within 
existing initiatives sponsored by the federal government and that involves many of the relevant 
stakeholders, such as the Federally-sponsored Health Information and Security Privacy 
Collaborative (HISPC), a project of ONC. Or, the framework concept could be conducted with 
only limited federal involvement though a public health professional organization, such as 
ASTHO, NACCHO or CSTE. These organizations typically rely on funding from CDC to 
conduct specific projects such as the development of a framework but have the capacity to carry 
out much of the work, including convening stakeholders, developing content and communicating 
policy and program development needs. Ultimately, however, the involvement of federal 
agencies is necessary to the successful development of the framework because they are key 
stakeholders in the protection and exchange of public health information.  
Regardless of whether support for development of the framework comes from the highest 
levels of government or it is a grassroots effort (or both), communication will be critical to the 
implementation of the framework. Communication with stakeholders, especially state and local 
public health about the need and rationale for the framework will be essential and can be 
accomplished through the public health professional organizations and other informal networks 
of public health professionals. Communication through engaged public health officials with 
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federal policy makers as well as with state policy makers regarding implementation needs will 
also be important. And, communication with the public and other stakeholders via public health 
partner organizations that often engage in these kinds of communications efforts via the news 
media, print, and education campaigns, although less critical, will still be necessary.  
  
Opportunities for Implementation and Need for Policy Change 
The purpose of developing the framework is to build consensus, establish a dialog, and 
engage stakeholders in a discussion about common principles and practices in protecting public 
health privacy. Part or all of the approach may ultimately be memorialized in law or regulation. 
Given the concerns about federal legislation expressed by the key informants who participated in 
this study and for Constitutional reasons, federal legislation would not be the ideal means to 
begin to implement or enforce the principles adopted in the framework. Instead, legislative 
change based on the principles in the framework should occur at the state level, depending on the 
needs of each state. In other states where no legislative change is needed or where no legislative 
change is feasible, the framework might be used to change practices and procedures within 
health departments.  
Although key informants interviewed for this study suggested federal legislation would 
not be desirable, several did suggest that there might be a role for the federal government in 
developing the framework.  These roles might include facilitator of state policy change and 
encouraging common practices in protecting public health information. Although there mixed 
opinions about model laws, a few of the interviewees suggested the federal government in 
addition to convening the group that would develop the framework could also convene groups to 
revise the existing model state public health laws. Others, concerned that models create a 
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misleading standard, suggested that the federal government create a “checklist” or measurement 
model be created for states to evaluate their state privacy laws against, using principles from the 
framework. Existing model acts, which were created almost a decade ago for distinctly different 
purposes, may not strike the desired balance and all of the technological factors relevant to 
public health practice today. It was suggested by one informant that HISPC be used to develop 
such a model or checklist. One state official argued that the development of such a model was an 
appropriate role for CDC.  
One key informant suggested CDC establish a best practices-type of project for the 
sharing of public health information under which states could be funded to design and replicate 
best policies and practices associated with the protection and exchange of public health 
surveillance data. Another suggestion raised by one key informant was to establish federal 
policies that encourage the adoption of agreements between states. Interviewees suggested an 
approach similar to the development and implementation of the Emergency Management 
Assistance Compact (EMAC), an interstate compact with a governance structure funded by 
federal dollars that enables states to assist each other during times of emergency. Federal 
legislation helped to establish the EMAC. Yet another role suggested for the federal government 
was funding of additional research around the need for, and value of, disclosure of particular 
types of public health information. Such research would require federal funding, although not 
necessarily legislative change. At the agency level, the development of new CDC policies related 
to privacy and data use or revisions to the CDC policy on the re-release of data might flow from 
or help to implement the Framework.  
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Future Research Opportunities and Evaluating Implementation of the Framework  
Ultimately, the framework, or any effort to develop or implement a common 
understanding of public health privacy and disclosure would need to be evaluated. The 
evaluation plan would need to include different approaches to various aspects of the overall 
effort. This study, in a sense, serves as a formative evaluation for the framework concept. If an 
effort to develop the framework were implemented process and outcome or impact evaluations 
would also be needed. For example, if a FACA is utilized to develop the framework, process 
measures might be used to assess whether the FACA mechanism engaged all the appropriate 
stakeholders and developed a framework. If a model act or checklist is used to implement the 
framework, the outcomes would be appropriate to assess. Outcomes measured might include 
how many states implemented what aspects of the recommendations in the form of changes to 
state laws. An impact assessment would the ideal way to measure the impact of the framework 
development and implementation effort on information exchange among state and federal 
partners. These types of assessments are challenging to conduct due because it is difficult to 
control for confounding factors, such as changes in leadership, concurrent policy change, and 
changing budgets. Before, during, and after development and implementation, the framework 
would present opportunities to examine issues such as the demographic covariates associated 
with certain types of privacy and information sharing policies and practices across states in order 
to better understand what conditions facilitate the desired outcomes.  
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
There is a gap between how the public health leaders interviewed for this study 
understand the need to protect the privacy of public health information and the state and federal 
policies that currently address this issue. This gap has many significant ramifications, including 
that the lack of a consistent approach to public health privacy across jurisdictions may be a 
barrier to achieving objectives that are essential to improving health and public health practice in 
this country. For example, it may be a barrier to the establishment of electronic health records, 
the implementation of the reform of the health system in this country to integrate prevention and 
acute care, and the implementation of a nationwide public health surveillance infrastructure to 
provide early warning of emerging or changing threats to human health such as pandemic 
influenza. There is also a second significant gap between the how the public health leaders 
interviewed for this study understand the need to protect the privacy and security of public health 
information and existing model laws intended to influence the development of state laws. State 
officials interviewed for this study indicated that model public health laws have been influential 
in drawing attention to the problem of inadequate state laws but the provisions have generally 
not been adopted by states.  
As one means to begin to fill these gaps, a plan to develop a set of common principles, a 
framework, around the privacy of public health information is proposed in the previous chapter. 
The rationale for proposing that change should begin with a framework as opposed to a new 
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model law is that through conducting this research, it became clear that there is a need for 
additional consensus and thought within the public health community about what privacy 
protections are necessary and appropriate for public health information and what policies would 
only create additional barriers to public health practice. The framework, as conceptualized in this 
study, could later, be implemented through changes in policy at the local, state, and federal levels 
as well as the dissemination of model laws and best practices across the public health 
community. Depending on the principles reflected in the framework, each state would have to 
review its existing laws and develop statutory language that best implements the principles 
within its statutory and practice schemes. For example, in states where public health is 
centralized at the state level, the statutory scheme might look very different from states with 
local control of public health. Model language or other approaches to encouraging or facilitating 
state policy changes that reflect the agreed upon principles can be developed with relative ease as 
a method of communicating the goals and ideas about how to best protect privacy.   
The recommendation to start with a framework or set of principles rather than a model 
law is also based on a recognition that more policies, regardless of whether the policies influence 
activities or programs indirectly or whether the policies have the force of law, are not always 
better for public health practice. Even where the weight of the evidence of the benefit of policy 
change for health outcomes is profound, such as in tobacco control and injury prevention, there 
remain many questions and disagreements about the unintended consequences of “too much” 
policy or policy schemes that are less than ideally suited to achieve the intended outcome. These 
considerations need to be balanced with the fact that development of policies, even imperfect 
policies, can help to create consensus or a mutual understanding that serves as the tipping point 
for actions that lead to the intended outcome. For example, in tobacco control, when a smoke-
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free indoor air ordinance is introduced in a community, even if the policy change effort is not 
successful, the dialog that is created in the community around making tobacco use a non-
normative behavior has been shown to have a measurable effect on tobacco use.149 And, it is a 
generally accepted legal principal that where policies are clearly articulated, plainly worded, and 
easily understandable, the likelihood of a common interpretation of those policies is increased.  
I contend that the development of a set of principles related to the privacy and security of 
public health information that reflects the balance between the need to protect information and 
disclose it could have a lasting impact on both public health policy and practice. 
Recommendations from Federal Advisory Committees and other panels that have attempted to 
address moral or ethical challenges in health been recognized as having a lasting impact on 
practice and policy. For example, the National Bioethics Advisory Commission and its precursor 
entities, issued the Belmont Report, which dramatically impacted the way researchers think 
about and conduct human subjects research and resulted in federal legislation that translated 
principles into practical requirements.150 Even more recent and less prominent efforts to outline 
common principles for public health, such as the Public Health Leadership Society’s Principles 
of the Ethical Practice of Public Health,151 have arguably at least helped to draw attention to 
particular issues.  
It is true, however, that the most well-known and impactful of such efforts were 
developed at least in part as a response to a real or perceived public health crisis. And, it is not 
really clear if there is a profound enough crisis within the tension between information sharing 
and privacy to lead to the pursuit of the framework or a similar initiative. It is possible that a 
situation similar to the purported disclosure by federal officials of the name of an airline 
passenger with extremely drug resistant tuberculosis to the news media in the context of the 
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currently emerging influenza pandemic could open an obvious policy window. Beginning a 
dialog before such an event would increase the likelihood of utilizing that policy window when it 
is open. 
The relationship between the development of the framework proposed here and the health 
impact or outcomes is not proximate in the way that, for example, counseling members of at risk 
populations about unhealthy behaviors can be quantified and the counseling activity can be 
linked directly to improved outcomes. The development of a set of principles, instead, supports 
other critical public health activities including public health surveillance, biosurveillance, and 
public health emergency response and recovery operations. This distal relationship might cause 
some individuals to be critical of the potential value of addressing the privacy and security of 
health information. While there is some value in pursuing only initiatives and approaches that 
themselves lead to a demonstrable impact on health, there is a competing, and perhaps more 
pressing, need to give some consideration to the social structures and assumptions that underlie 
public health practice itself.  
 Assuming the development of a set of common principles related to the privacy, 
protection, and appropriate sharing of public health information by CDC or one of the other 
organizations described in the previous chapter is both a worthwhile and feasible approach, the 
question then becomes how likely is it to happen? Creating major change of any type is not easy. 
There are innumerable theories on how to create change. For example, Harvard Business School 
Professor John Kotter details a process with eight stages: 1) establishing a sense of urgency, 2) 
creating a guiding coalition, 3) developing a vision and a strategy, communicating the change 
vision, 4) empowering broad-based action, 6) generating short-term wins, 7) consolidating gains 
and producing more change, and 8) anchoring new approaches in the culture.152 Jim Collins, a 
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former Stanford University professor, describes “getting the right people on the bus,” “level 5 
leadership,” and “turning the flywheel” as means to create change.153 Both are excellent 
approaches. Certainly establishing momentum by getting the right people involved early in the 
development of the Framework would be critical as would developing a vision and a strategy. 
However, no single theory completely describes what would be required to create and implement 
the Framework.  
At present, much of the public health system faces tenuous circumstances, including 
budget cuts, furloughs, shortages of critical personnel, and the exhaustion of resources. With 
these challenges, it is difficult to make the case for new efforts of any kind, particularly one that 
may not appear to have an immediate impact on health outcomes. Still, there is an urgent need 
for public health to clarify state privacy laws in order to enable the flow of public health 
surveillance data and information among the states and between the states and the federal 
government. States and CDC must have the capability to quickly collect, analyze, and use the 
necessary data to track the spread of the H1N1 influenza virus, identify changes in the 
characteristics virus, and understand the efficacy of the vaccine.  Less immediately but still 
importantly, there is a need to resolve privacy law conflicts that prevent public health from 
developing interoperability in surveillance systems across jurisdictions to enable detection of a 
bioterrorism event or an emerging infectious disease. Current approaches to disease surveillance 
may not identify disease events in time for interventions to work effectively.   
There are several specific actions that could lead to the development of the Framework.  
These include:   
• A formal process evaluation of the sharing of information among federal agencies 
engaged in pandemic H1N1 influenza;  
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• Development of advice to states related to the implementation of the reporting 
requirements of the International Health Regulations and the related privacy and 
security considerations; 
• Development of target capabilities for federal, state, and local public health agencies 
and Emergency Response Function 8 partners for the sharing of epidemiologic 
information that includes sub-capabilities related to privacy protections; 
• Requiring CDC programs receiving Terrorism Preparedness or Emergency Response 
or Influenza funding to collaborate in a dialog around the development of a set of 
common privacy and information sharing principles; 
• Providing states receiving Public Health Emergency Preparedness opportunities to 
collaborate on the development of the Framework and technical assistance with 
implementation;  
• Developing a measurement model for state information sharing and privacy 
protection policies and reporting on state progress; 
• Conducting an exercise involving multiple federal agencies that specifically addresses 
information sharing; and 
• Engagement of civil liberties and patient rights stakeholder organizations in public 
health future preparedness exercises and a post-exercise debriefing with those 
organizations to develop a mutual understanding.  
 
Through the approaches and opportunities for change listed above, public health can 
begin to address some of the mechanics of creating privacy laws that provide public health 
practitioners the flexibility they need. However, the intersection of privacy and public health is 
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really an intersection of competing value systems. If public health is to really achieve its full 
purpose of community engagement, we should seek to engage in the development of privacy 
policies and view privacy issues as an opportunity and a means, not a barrier, to action.   
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APPENDIX A. KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW RECRUITMENT EMAIL 
 
Dear Colleague, 
You are a public health leader who is familiar with the challenges and opportunities related to the 
balance between maintaining the privacy and confidentiality of public health records and sharing 
those records for public health purposes. I am a student in the Executive Doctor of Public Health 
program at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill working on a research study related 
to this issue. The purpose of the research study survey is to evaluate the impact of state public 
health laws on information sharing among public health leadership within states and between the 
states and the federal government.  
As part of the study, I will be conducting key informant interviews. As a leader in this issue, 
your participation is requested in an interview during the week of February 9, 2009. Participation 
in the study is entirely voluntary and will be confidential. The study has been approved by the 
University of North Carolina IRB. For the interview, I will ask you a series of questions about 
your ability to share information and your opinion on state public health laws as they relate to the 
ability of health officials to share information. The interview will last about 60 minutes. There 
are no benefits to you for participating and the only risk to you would be disclosure of your 
identify; however, because I will not record your name with the interview notes and the notes 
will be kept under lock, that risk is minimal. Approximately 20-25 participants will participate in 
the interview portion of this study. The results from all of the interviews will be aggregated in 
such a way that you will not be identifiable.  
Later this week, I will contact you by telephone to ascertain your willingness to participate in an 
interview. If you are unable or unwilling to participate but could suggest an alternate person in 
your organization, such as your privacy officer or your general counsel, that I could contact, that 
would be appreciated. I look forward to speaking with you and please do not hesitate to ask me 
any questions you may have regarding the study. Thank you very much.  
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
Jean O’Connor, JD, MPH 
Candidate for the DrPH degree 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill  
Email: jco@email.unc.edu 
Phone: 404-285-1300 
 
IRB # 08-2022 
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APPENDIX B. STATE KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW DISCUSSION GUIDE 
 
 
1. Could you please tell me about what your roles in the health department?  
2. I would like to learn more about how your state addresses privacy. Can you tell me about 
any programs or other officials in your state or others that you commonly interact with 
that are involved in privacy issues related to public health? 
3. What are some of the current issues your state is facing in health-related privacy? 
4. Can you give me an example of dilemma or challenge related to the privacy of health-
related information you have faced in your state? 
5. I am in the process of researching state health-related privacy laws. Can you characterize 
your state privacy statutes for me as well as any major recent developments in case law?  
a. How does your law treat acquisition, use, and disclosure of health-related 
information by the health department?  
b. Do your state statutes meet the needs of the health department?  
c. Do you think they meet the needs of individuals?  
d. What about health care providers?  
e. Does your state law allow for dual use of public health data or information? In 
other words, sharing of information collected for public health purposes for other 
purposes, like law enforcement.  
f. Are there any holes or gaps in your state privacy laws that you would fill if you 
could?  
6. How did your state privacy statutes come to look the way they way do? For example, did 
your state adopt model legislation or is there a particular interest group or lobby that 
played an important role in shaping your law.  
7. Tell me about how privacy practices, beyond the requirements of the letter of the law, are 
carried out at your health department? How is training of staff, enforcement of policies, 
and corrective action taken? 
8. Federal officials sometimes hear that privacy considerations are a reason states are 
reluctant to share data. What do you think about that?  
9. There are several federal initiatives related to connecting public health surveillance 
systems to speed the reporting of health-related information from health care providers to 
the federal government for earlier detection of public health events. What privacy issues, 
if any, would something like this raise for your state?  
10. Would you have any reservations about data or information you reported to one federal 
agency being shared with another? What about if it did not have personally identifiable 
health information?  
11. Are there are resources or activities that you think are needed to improve the protection 
of public health information (or allow the sharing of more health information) at your 
health department or within your state? At the federal level?  
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APPENDIX C. FEDERAL KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW DISCUSSION GUIDE 
 
1. Please tell me about your role with your agency or organization? 
2. What type (state, federal, local) of organization do you work for? 
3. Describe your responsibility within that organization? 
4. Tell me about the data or information about disease outbreaks, health conditions, or 
things affecting human health in your jurisdiction that you work with?  
a. Case reports? If yes, are those laboratory-confirmed cases?  
b. Information about epidemiologic investigations? 
c. Can you please provide an example? 
5. How do you use the public health information you work with?  
6. Do laws, regulations, or other types of policies affect, positively or negatively, your 
ability to share public health-related information either with state public health 
officials or with other federal public health officials? Please tell me about that.  
7. Tell me about your knowledge of the laws and policies in your jurisdiction that 
pertain to what public health information you should share and when.  
a. Are you confident in your knowledge of the laws and policies? 
b. Are there aspects of the law that you wish you understood better? 
8. As you know, there are several federal initiatives related to improving the sharing of 
information for response. Where do you think those initiatives are headed? Why?  
9. What are the barriers to achieving success in some of those initiatives? 
a. Information technology? 
b. Privacy issues? 
c. Use of information issues? 
10. Is there any specific law or policy that you think needs to be changed to improve your 
ability to share public health information with relevant groups?  
11. Is there anything else you would like to add?  
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APPENDIX D. KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW TELEPHONE CONSENT SCRIPT 
 
Hello, my name is Jean O’Connor. I am a DrPH student at the University of North Carolina 
at Chapel Hill; I’m conducting a study about state public health laws and how they affect the 
sharing of information among public health leaders. Specifically, I am interviewing members 
of the Homeland Security Presidential Directive-21 BioSurveillance Working Group and 
state public health leaders. Your participation in this study is completely voluntary, meaning 
you do not have to participate unless you choose to do so.  
Would you be willing to answer some questions to help me determine if you are eligible for 
this study?  
(If person says no, thank them for their time and that they are not eligible for the 
study. If they answer yes, proceed) 
Thank you. Do you participate in the HSPD-21Working Group or are you a state health 
official? 
(If person says no, thank them for their time and that they are not eligible for the 
study. If they answer yes, proceed) 
Thank you. The purpose of this research study survey is to evaluate the impact of state public 
health laws on information sharing among public health leadership within states and between 
the states and the federal government. We estimate that approximately 13 participants will 
participate in the interview portion of this study. For the interview, I will ask you a series of 
questions about your opinion on the status of state public health laws as they relate to the 
ability of health officials to share information. This should take about 60 minutes. You do not 
have to answer any of the questions. If that is the case, we will skip that question and go on 
to the next one.  
All the information I receive from you by phone, including your name and any other 
identifying information, will be strictly confidential and will be kept under lock and key. I 
will not identify you or use any information that would make it possible for anyone to 
identify you in any presentation or written reports about this study. If it is okay with you, I 
might want to use direct quotes from you, but these would only be quoted as coming from “a 
person.” When all the interviews have been completed, I will analyze the results and present 
them in aggregated form. I will not identify individual participants. 
The only risk to you associated with participating might be if your identity were ever 
revealed. However, I will not even record your name with your responses, so this cannot 
occur. There are no other expected risks to you for participating. There are also no expected 
benefits for you either.  
 
This study is unfunded. This study is being conducted to complete the dissertation 
requirement for a DrPH at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. My Chairperson 
is Dr. Tom Ricketts, a Professor in the Department of Health Policy and Administration.  
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As you know, all research on human volunteers is reviewed by a committee that works to 
protect your rights and welfare. If you have questions or concerns about your rights as a 
research subject, you may contact—anonymously if you wish—the Institutional Review 
Board at 919-966-3113 or by email to IRB_subjects@unc.edu. 
Do you have any questions?  
Do I have your permission to begin asking you questions?  
It would be helpful to me for the purposes of taking notes if I could record our conversation. 
Do I have your permission to audiotape this interview? I will erase the taps after my notes 
have been transcribed.  
(If person says no, thank them and let them know the recorder is not on. If they say yes, 
thank them and let them know the tape is now on.) 
 
IRB #08-2022 
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